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ABSTRACT
The right to privacy, as applied to LGBT rights, is often described as a sort of tolerance: Sexuality is tolerated
as long as it remains hidden in the bedroom. This tension between tolerance and open expression of sexuality has
been at the center of numerous debates over LGBT legal strategy. Thus, this Article argues for a counter-intuitive
result: The right to privacy has also been used to advance the seemingly more radical right to be sexual.
This Article excavates the early history of LGBT legal organizing in order to show how the tension between the
right to privacy and the right to sexuality has played out within the LGBT legal movement, and how the right to
privacy was shaped by and shared overlapping concerns with the right to be sexual. In order to support this claim,
this Article takes a deep dive into the world of LGBT legal organizing in the 1960s and 1970s. This Article
shows how contrasting visions over LGBT rights shaped the issues that became important and the claims that
activists made in court.
After examining the organizational history of early LGBT rights, this Article turns specifically to discussions
between LGBT lawyers regarding sodomy reform. By tracing the decisions leading up to Bowers v. Hardwick,
this Article shows how claims to the right to privacy were in tension with but also ultimately shaped by ideas
about the right to be sexual.
The payoff for this historical excavation is a richer understanding of the role of activist lawyers in pushing new
constitutional meanings. This Article concludes with a discussion of how the right to be sexual helps us to
understand the relationship between dignity and the identity-based logic of LGBT rights.
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INTRODUCTION
When the history of LGBT rights is told, it is often told as one of triumph,
victory, or a dream fulfilled.1 In this telling, LGBT rights is the story of going
from a time when “homosexuals were virtually without constitutional rights”
to “a twenty-first-century America in which gays can marry” throughout the
country.2 But while much of this history has been told before, this Article
argues that the dominant understanding of it is incomplete.
Before LGBT rights emerged as a coherent category, the “right to be
sexual” offered an alternate model for LGBT activists.3 To oversimplify,
claims of LGBT rights describe gay people as basically the same as everyone
else and deserving of protection from discrimination on that basis.4 Claims
of the right to be sexual describe gay people as basically different from
everyone else and deserving of dignity and respect for their sexual choices.5
LGBT rights asks for the state to leave LGBT people alone. The right to be
sexual demands state recognition and support.
This Article excavates the early history of LGBT legal organizing in order
to show how the tension between the right to privacy and the right to be
sexual has played out within the LGBT legal movement, and how the right
to privacy was shaped by and shared overlapping concerns with the right to
be sexual. In order to support this claim, the article takes a deep dive into
the world of LGBT legal organizing in the 1960s and 1970s. This Article
shows how contrasting visions of LGBT rights shaped the issues that became
important and the claims that activists made in court.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews historical writings on
the right to be sexual before offering my own full definition of it. This Article
argues for the normative desirability of the right to be sexual and compare it
to LGBT rights. Part II tells a detailed history of LGBT legal organizing in
the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than focus on specific cases or issues, this
history proceeds by way of focusing on the organizations involved and how

1

2
3

4
5

See, e.g., DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE DREAM: THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 7 (2014); LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY
REVOLUTION, at xiii (2012).
WALTER FRANK, LAW AND THE GAY RIGHTS STORY: THE LONG SEARCH FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
IN A DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 1 (2014).
Mary C. Dunlap, Toward Recognition of “A Right to be Sexual,” 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 245, 245
(1982). The “right to be sexual” was first declared by Mary Dunlap in 1982. Patricia A. Cain, “The
Right to Be Sexual” (Revisited): Remembering Mary Dunlap, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 20 (2004).
Cf. Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, 93 SOCIALIST REV.
9, 40 (1987) (describing difference and sameness models of gay identity).
See infra Part I (defining the right to be sexual).
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the activists involved talked about their goals. The right to be sexual
overlapped with and competed with LGBT rights as a legal category to
describe their goals. This Article examines key litigation involving
immigration, partner benefits, and prisons to show how the tension between
LGBT rights and the right to be sexual played out doctrinally.
Sodomy reform was a priority for all of the LGBT legal organizations
when they were founded. But it was not the only priority. Part III turns to
the history of sodomy reform, explaining how it became the defining goal of
LGBT rights by the mid 1980s. This Article argues that sodomy reform
became a vehicle for talking about the larger meaning of the right to be
sexual and LGBT rights.6 This part begins with a discussion of the sodomy
roundtables. It then turns to key pre-Hardwick sodomy litigation. Part III
concludes by reinterpreting some of the known history of Bowers v. Hardwick
and adding in additional history that reveals more debate over legal strategies
than is commonly recognized. This Article’s theory of a right to be sexual
sheds new light on the organizational disagreements over this case.
In addition to a richer historical understanding of LGBT rights, this
Article contributes to how we understand LGBT rights today. Part IV argues
that the right to be sexual remains a viable theory today. This Article
analyzes Supreme Court opinions on LGBT rights through the lens of the
right to be sexual. This analysis reveals how the Court has implicitly
accepted central tenets of the right to be sexual. Moreover, this Article
argues that LGBT rights has only succeeded because the Court has implicitly
accepted the right to be sexual.
I. DEFINING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL
The idea of LGBT rights is that LGBT people, as a group, deserve
constitutional protection under principles of privacy and equal protection.
According to this view, LGBT people do not threaten the basic institutions
of society. They are different from the majority only in a small and
insignificant respect. As critics note, LGBT rights are won at the cost of
hiding sexuality itself.7 LGBT people are protected as a group, but on
6

7

Similarly, with reference to same-sex marriage today, Doug NeJaime refers to same-sex marriage’s
role in a broader movement as “talking around marriage.” See Douglas NeJaime, Introduction: Talking
Around Marriage, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 679 (2012) (“Marriage did not define and structure the
dialogue around sexuality and gender. Rather, it provided a lens for analysis and often receded
into the background.”).
See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS, at xi (2006)
(arguing that lesbians and gays need to “cover” their sexuality in order to win protection from
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condition that they do not talk about their sexual conduct or fundamentally
challenge the state in any way. In contrast, the right to be sexual foregrounds
sexuality. It claims protection from state regulation based on the dignity of
sexual choices and sexual identities. It deemphasizes individual identities,
focusing on the claim that all sexual choices deserve the same dignity and
respect. The state can regulate sexual violence and lack of consent, but its
justifications cannot be about the dignity or morality of sexual conduct. The
right to be sexual fundamentally challenges the state to recognize the dignity
of all people.
Mary Dunlap, a respected lesbian feminist lawyer and legal scholar in the
early LGBT movement, first defined the right to be sexual as “the idea that
an individual’s sexual choices are basic.”8 She set out to define “the right to
be actively sexual for its own sake”9 and “a positive concept of sexual
relationships.”10 For Dunlap, the right to be sexual was grounded in respect
of the dignity of individual moral choices.11 Dunlap argued that if LGBT
activists limited themselves to the doctrinal categories of privacy and
equality—the standard bases of LGBT rights—they would unnecessarily
limit the right to be sexual.12 To illustrate her concerns, she used examples
of an elderly woman ejected from a nursing home for her “persistent
association” with a male resident and a white girl expelled from a private

8

9
10

11

12

discrimination); see also URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION 4 (1995) (arguing that gay and lesbian people have “virtual equality,”
meaning they “possess some of the trappings of full equality but are denied all of its benefits”).
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247. Dunlap and many of her colleagues consciously drew on a sex-positive
feminism that took challenging society’s sex-negativity as a core part of its goal. Cf. Patricia A.
Cain, “The Right to Be Sexual” (Revisited): Remembering Mary Dunlap, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 19
(2004).
Annamay T. Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 229, 231
(1982) (citing Dunlap, supra note 3, at 245).
Cain, supra note 8, at 21–23 (explaining that since “the Court never developed a positive concept
of sexual relationships,” and has instead focused on the right to privacy, Dunlap “argue[d] that the
privacy decisions imply there is a constitutionally protected ‘right to be sexual.’”).
See Mary C. Dunlap, In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1985, Michael J. Bowers,
Petitioner, v. Michael Hardwick, et al., Respondents. Brief Amicus Curiae For the Lesbian Rights Project,
Women’s Legal Defense Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. and the National Women’s Law Center., 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 949, 950 (1986) (explaining that the amicus brief filed with the Supreme
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick written on behalf of the Lesbian Rights Project and other women’s rights
organizations deliberately argued for the dignity of lesbian and gay sex); see also Brief for Lesbian
Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
168 (1986) (No. 85-140) (emphasizing “the citizens’ capacities for responsible individual judgment
in the area of consenting adult sexual behavior”).
See Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247 (describing the right to be sexual as crabbed and inconsistent if
advanced under the doctrine of privacy).
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school for holding hands with a black male friend.13 Dunlap argued that,
rather than shoehorn these examples into standard doctrinal categories of
due process and equal protection, LGBT lawyers should develop the right to
be sexual as a more persuasive basis for addressing the state’s fear of the open
expression of sexuality.
Other lawyers and activists writing at the same time and in the same
circles as Dunlap also rejected the exclusive focus on LGBT people as the
group affected by a right to be sexual. They offered various criteria,
including “the multiplicity of situations in which a person’s sexual orientation
interfaces with the law[,]”14 the male/female dichotomy,15 and laws targeting
“reproductive biology.”16 From these various starting points, they argued
that “a strong affirmative interest in sexual expression and relationships” can
be found in “our constitutional visions of liberty and equality.”17 Many of
these scholars and activists were forthright in acknowledging that they were
experimenting with new legal theories and claims. While they discussed
equality, they argued that it had to move beyond tests of formal classifications
to recognize concerns with how the state regulated self-determination.18 Any
form of LGBT rights that required sexual minorities to pretend to be just like
heterosexuals in order to win legal protections could not constitute a real
affirmation of the right to be sexual.19
13

14

15
16
17
18

19

Id. at 245 (citing Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 906, 908 (D. Conn. 1979) and Fiedler v.
Marumsco Baptist Church, 486 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev’d sub nom. Fielder v. Marumsco
Christian School, 631 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1980)). Dunlap similarly stressed this intersectionality in
her earlier work. See Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1147 (1979) (“An essential commonality exists
among the distinct groups—women, homosexuals, mothers of illegitimate children, sexually
reassigned persons, and others—who have suffered from the power of the law to prescribe sex
identity . . . .”).
Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799 (1979). For further analysis on legal discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, see Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part I,
10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the MidEighties Part II,1 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275 (1986); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1980–1981).
See Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247 (explaining that the right to be sexual may inhibit the sexual freedom
of females if it is derived from a stereotypical dichotomous model of sexuality).
See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1008–9 (1984) (proposing
a particular level of scrutiny for laws that govern reproductive biology).
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WISC. L. REV. 187, 225, 228 (1988).
See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 806 (1990) (“[F]eminist
theory will be better served if we refocus our energy from the debate about equality to a more direct
debate about the meaning of self-definition.”).
See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907, 908 (1986) (“[The client] is forced to deny any pride in her
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Like Dunlap, I define the right to be sexual as broader than just the right
to be left alone. It is different in its justification and in the demands it places
on the state. While the justification for the right to be left alone might be
described as tolerance, the right to be sexual is justified by respect for the
dignity of sexual identities and sexual choices. 20 This is a dignity that inheres
in the person, not one that is conferred by the State.21 It is a dignity that the
state can recognize but not one that the state can create.
The right to privacy demands just that the state not interfere with what
people do in their bedrooms. It prevents government imposition of harm.
The right to be sexual prevents the government from using sexuality to define
a class for disability or stigma. It demands positive state action to integrate
sexual minorities into society.
This demand might include
nondiscrimination and affirmative action laws and policies; healthcare
benefits and medical research; support services for LGBT youth; and
changed immigration policies.
By arguing that the right to be sexual was a viable alternative to LGBT
rights, I do not mean to argue that LGBT activists chose freely between these
theories. Because minority rights in the United States developed to protect
blacks, other minority groups—including lesbians and gays—fared better
when they seemed analogous to blacks.22 Thus, gays and lesbians could claim
to be an oppressed minority group—defined by their sexuality rather than
their race—who were seeking access to the same rights that everyone else
enjoyed.23 The right to be sexual did not match this identity-based model of
minority rights. By arguing that the right to be sexual was a viable alternative
to LGBT rights, I mean to broaden the discussion of what constitutes LGBT
law. LGBT legal organizations did not only think in terms of the narrow

20
21

22

23

lesbianism, any solidarity with other lesbians; she may even be compelled to deny or alter her sexual
relationship.”).
See Cain, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining that Dunlap’s amicus brief in Hardwick argued that love is a
moral choice, rejecting the traditional arguments that focused on geographical privacy).
In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy describes marriage laws as a mechanism in which the
state confers dignity on a couple. 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013). Noa Ben-Asher has described the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Windsor as a “weak dignity” because it assumes that the state confers
dignity rather than seeing dignity as inherent in all people. Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The
Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 243–44 (2014). However, the
broader discussion of dignity in Windsor suggests that Justice Kennedy would be sympathetic to the
argument that the dignity of sexual choice and identity is inherent in the person.
See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 314–15 (2002) (arguing that
LGBT rights faced a challenge insofar as lesbians and gays were not seen as similar to racial
minorities).
See Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the
1950s–1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 340–41 (2009) (discussing how gay activists introduced a racesexuality analogy in the courts).
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identity-based claims of minority rights. They also actively pursued the right
to be sexual. Even as LGBT rights became the dominant model, the right to
be sexual continued to inform the strategic debates within the LGBT legal
organizations. Recovering this history of how the right to be sexual
overlapped with and competed with LGBT rights as a basis for articulating
arguments of liberty and equality is important to analyzing persistent
questions of whether we protect sexual minorities because they are just like
everyone else or because we respect some sphere of dignity around sexual
choices.24
II. TRACING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL IN EARLY LGBT LEGAL
ORGANIZING
Historical scholarship on LGBT rights addresses three overlapping
themes: Judicial treatment of LGBT rights, civil rights as a model for LGBT
rights, and social movement histories of LGBT rights. This scholarship is
dominated by court-focused histories. The identity-based logic of LGBT
rights is obvious in the titles of key historical scholarship: Gaylaw,25 Litigating
for Lesbian and Gay Rights,26 Rainbow Rights,27 Queers in Court,28 Gay Rights and
American Law,29 Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. The Supreme Court,30 From
the Closet to the Courtroom: Five LGBT Rights Lawsuits that Have Changed Our
Nation.31 This scholarship traces the history of LGBT rights from early
procedural challenges to police harassment, through constitutional
challenges to sodomy laws, and to more robust claims for equal protection
under the law. LGBT rights is defined by the demand to be left alone by the
state and by the claim that LGBT people are just like everyone else. These
studies provide several different explanations for the changing meaning of
LGBT rights. These explanations include cultural attitudes towards LGBT
24

25
26
27
28
29
30

31

Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–75 (2004) (outlining similar persistent tensions in the
justification for protection of racial minorities).
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999).
Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993).
PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN
AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000).
SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT: GAY RIGHTS LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (2007).
DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW (2003).
JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT (2001).
CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS
THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION (2010). But see MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE:
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE 57–93 (2010) (analyzing Boutilier v. INS
through lens of Supreme Court cases dealing with sexual freedom and equality).
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people,32 judicial politics,33 the roles of individual lawyers and plaintiffs,34 and
broader changes in legal doctrine on privacy and equal protection.35
Along the way, these court-focused studies discuss some disagreements
over the meaning of LGBT rights. In particular, they highlight the recurring
argument raised by some LGBT rights lawyers that it is important to talk
about real LGBT people in court.36 These lawyers were concerned that
when legal arguments were just about the abstract categories of privacy and
equal protection, the dignity of actual LGBT people disappeared.37 These
dignitary concerns are related to the issues that I raise in this Article.
However, in current historical scholarship, they are treated as discrete
strategic debates: Should LGBT lawyers talk just about privacy or talk also
about the people impacted by privacy laws?38 This Article shows that these
disagreements were more than strategic issues. These disagreements are
related to the unresolved tensions between protecting people based on the
right to be sexual and LGBT rights.
Several key studies also focus on individual cases, revealing the particular
historical context leading up to the case and influencing its outcome. Dale
Carpenter finds that Lawrence v. Texas depended upon an almost unbelievable
cast of characters, including local police in Texas and a politically-sensitive
bartender, to transform what could have been routine police harassment of
gay men into a major constitutional challenge.39 Carpenter shows how the
constitutional case was shaped by local and national politics. Similarly, Lisa
Keen and Suzanne Goldberg discuss how local lawyers in Colorado thought
about the challenge in Romer v. Evans in different terms from national lawyers
32
33
34
35
36

37

38
39

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 2–4 (describing cultural construction of homosexuality as
underlying legal regulation of lesbians and gays).
See PINELLO, supra note 29, at 72-105 (explaining court decisions based on judicial attitudes model).
For detailed studies of individual cases and the roles of individual actors in those cases, see BALL,
supra note 31; MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 30.
See Konnoth, supra note 23, at 352–57 (discussing changes in the doctrinal approach to analyzing
minority groups).
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861-2003 138 (2008) (describing how Frank Kameny utilized politics of recognition to advocate
for the decriminalization of sodomy laws).
See Cain, supra note 26, at 1591–1611 (illustrating how early sodomy cases led LGBT litigators to
argue that gay identity/status was distinct from sodomy); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623,
1639–44 (1997) (comparing LGBT rights litigation that directly challenged the regulation of
conduct with litigation that implicitly accepted regulation of conduct in order to argue for
discrimination based on identity).
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 154–55 (discussing first federal challenge to sodomy laws under
privacy theory).
See generally DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012)
(describing the legal strategy used by Lambda Legal attorneys).
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from the LGBT legal organizations.40 These studies are presented as adding
more nuance to specific chapters of LGBT rights. They do not change the
overall focus of the story from LGBT rights.
A second theme in this historical scholarship is the role of the civil rights
movement as a model for LGBT rights. In most studies, this is more of an
assumption than a major part of the analysis.41 Studies mention the civil
rights movement as a model but do not develop the alleged links.42 The civil
rights movement is assumed to provide organizational models for LGBT
organizations, public recognition of the idea of the public interest lawyer, and
direct precedents that LGBT rights lawyers could use.43 When told through
Hardwick, Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, and their analogies to Plessy,
Cleburne, Reed, Brown, Griswold, and Loving, LGBT rights becomes an obvious
extension of earlier civil rights. The earlier civil rights and women’s rights
cases offered a model of formal legal equality for LGBT lawyers. The work
of LGBT rights lawyers was to expand the established categories of civil
rights. This scholarship pays insufficient attention to how the arguments put
forth by LGBT rights lawyers did not simply parallel the civil rights cases that
they sometimes relied upon.44
A third theme in the historical literature on LGBT rights is social
movement studies. Because these studies focus on street politics and direct
action, they typically devote little attention to litigation.45 To the extent that
social movement studies do discuss LGBT rights litigation, most assume that
the development of LGBT legal organizations was an obvious response to
40
41
42
43

44

45

See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 17–
42 (1998) (discussing tensions between local and national lawyers).
But see Konnoth, supra note 23, at 340-69 (providing an in-depth analysis of how lesbian and gay
rights used civil rights precedents in the 1950s through 1970s).
See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 28, at 2 (suggesting that lesbian and gay rights “[hewed] most closely to
the civil rights model”).
See CAIN, supra note 27, at 49–53 (considering the tension and division that existed in civil rights
movements prior to gay and lesbian civil rights and arguing those tensions and divisions were
parallel to the ones faced by gay and lesbian civil rights); Konnoth, supra note 23, at 352–57
(considering past precedent that influenced LGBT rights); Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing
Cause Lawyering: Professionalism, Politics, and Social Change in 1960’s America 346–53 (May
2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (arguing that the
civil rights movement produced an idea of the public interest lawyer as devoted to fair procedure
and process).
See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 5 (2011) (“And reasoning from race did not only involve simple parallels or assertions
of equivalence. When advocates reasoned from race, they often engaged in more sophisticated uses
of comparative analysis.”).
But see Katherine Turk, “Our Militancy is in Our Openness”: Gay Employment Rights Activism in California
and the Question of Sexual Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 423, 427 (2013) (finding
that the same organizations engaged in direct action also sponsored key litigation in the 1960s).
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the growth of an LGBT social movement. One author claims that “the
history of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is in no short
measure the history of gay rights litigation in the United States.”46 Another
author describes Lambda as the “legal arm” of the gay movement, engaged
in a conventional civil rights approach to LGBT rights modeled after other
civil rights organizations.47 Social movement studies also commonly describe
the turn to LGBT rights litigation as an assimilationist strategy.48 Like the
other historical scholarship, social movement studies fail to address the
diversity of early approaches to litigation by LGBT activists and lawyers.
Turning to the contemporary organizational records, a different picture
emerges.49 Beginning in the 1950s, LGBT organizations turned to litigation
with a variety of different goals. Some might be described as mainstream
and assimilationist, but others were radical and liberationist.50 They did not
all fit neatly under the rubric of LGBT rights as we know them today. Even
as they slowly moved towards the identity-based claims that would become
the category of LGBT rights that we know today, their identity-based claims
were heavily infused with demands for the dignity and autonomy of sexual
conduct. The right to be sexual was as important as LGBT rights in these
early organizational goals. Ultimately, I argue that the category of LGBT
rights emerged as these organizations struggled to define what they do.
The organizational approach that I use in this Article provides a new
model for studying legal history. A growing scholarship that has been called
a “new civil rights history” deemphasizes the centrality of the Supreme
Court.51 In her groundbreaking study of civil rights history, Tomiko BrownNagin asks what civil rights would look like if we did not put the NAACP and

46
47
48

49

50

51

ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 27 (2005).
HIRSHMAN, supra note 1, at 148.
See, e.g., CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (2002) (describing the “assimilationist, legal-rights
framework”).
For a full organizational history, see Jeffrey Kosbie, Contested Identities: A History of LGBT Legal
Mobilization and the Ethics of Impact (June 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with author).
Cf. Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,
4–5 (arguing that the earliest same-sex marriage litigation was embedded in a politics of gay
liberation and not gay rights).
See Kenneth W. Mack, Civil Rights History: The Old and the New, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 258, 258
(2013) (footnote omitted) (defining the new civil rights history as a paradigm in which “civil rights
historians meld a traditional approach to the legal history of the subject . . . with that of traditional
social history” to “show that civil rights law and lawyers were a mediating force . . . between the
formal legal system and outsider communities”).
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Thurgood Marshall at the center of the story.52 She argues that we need to
include the more radical and more “pragmatic” civil rights strategies of
lawyers in Atlanta to fully explain the spread of civil rights across the
country.53 Risa Goluboff recovers a history of debates within the early
NAACP over labor rights.54 Christopher Schmidt turns to the question of
how lawyers and activists define the idea of law and its relation to society.55
And “[putting] aside the segregation-to-integration narrative” of civil rights,
Kenneth Mack focuses on the dilemmas of professional identity faced by
black lawyers.56
The new civil rights history challenges traditional legal history’s
overreliance on legal doctrine. Drawing on new sources of data, this
scholarship analyzes how the meaning of rights varies across communities,
racial and class boundaries, organizations, and time periods. What emerges
is a more complicated picture of how legal change happens. The microorganizational perspective that I use in this Article contributes to the
methodological tools of the new civil rights history. This Article relies on
internal records of the LGBT legal organizations, personal papers of lawyers,
and interviews with the lawyers involved to reconstruct the debates over the
right to be sexual.57 Paying attention to these organizational histories offers
fresh insights into the different ways legal meanings are constructed and
contested.

52

53
54
55

56

57

See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2 (2012) (“When civil rights litigation was undertaken, pragmatism
sometimes dictated different targets from those chosen by the NAACP and its legal arm, the
NAACP LDF.”).
Id.
See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 217–37 (2007) (tracing debates
leading to NAACP decision to drop labor issues).
Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 641,
643 (2011); see also Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-ins and the Role of the Courts in the
Civil Rights Movement, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 93, 94 (2015) (explaining how the social protest
movement influenced civil rights litigation).
KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWYER 8 (2012). Mack tells “a multiple biography of a group of African American lawyers . . .
[ranging] from famous figures . . . [to those] who have been largely lost to history.” Id. at 3–9.
Organizational records include Lambda Legal, the ACLU, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, National Gay Rights Advocates, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and other
organizations. Records were accessed from 10 universities and archival repositories, the
organizations themselves, and private papers of individual lawyers. Over seventy interviews were
completed with founders and key leaders of all the organizations. For more details on the research,
see Kosbie, supra note 49.
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A. Homophile Organizations
Before the “modern” era of LGBT activism, lesbians and gays organized
“homophile” organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. Because their litigation
was typically defensive—following a sodomy arrest or police raid—it was
often characterized as cautious and conservative.58 But the turn to litigation
in the homophile movement was about more than a demand to be left alone
by the state. It was also a demand for recognition of deviant sexualities. Even
when homophile activists moved closer to identity-based legal theories in the
late 1960s, the dignity of sexual choices remained central to their legal
theories.
Shortly after it was founded in 1951, the Mattachine Society decided to
defend one of its members after his arrest. Dale Jennings was followed home
from a popular gay cruising area by a plain-clothes police officer who
practically demanded entry to his apartment. Once inside, the officer
arrested Jennings for lewd behavior.59 In an era when this type of police
entrapment practice was common, the standard legal advice was to plead
guilty and never to admit to being gay.60 Dale Jennings rejected this advice,
admitting to his homosexuality in court and demanding a jury trial.61 In one
sense, Jennings’ legal claims did not require any state respect for the dignity
of sexual conduct. Jennings formal arguments sounded in police misconduct,
not dignity. But given the social context, the decision to openly admit to
being gay was a radical demand for recognition and respect.
By the early 1960s, homophile activists increasingly turned to the law to
fight police harassment and arrests in gay bars.62 A police raid on a 1964
New Year’s Eve ball in San Francisco, hosted by the Council on Religion
and the Homosexual, was one such turning point. Despite previous promises
58

59
60
61

62

Cain, supra note 8, at 1558–64 (discussing litigation under the homophile movement). See generally
JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970 (2d ed. 1998) (detailing complete history of
homophile movement).
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 70–71.
See JOHN D’EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE
UNIVERSITY 30–31 (1992) (describing Jennings arrest and typical practices at the time).
See id. at 31–32 (discussing Mattachine Society’s decision to fight Jennings arrest and legal tactics).
Jennings’ trial began on June 23, 1952. After a hung jury, the district attorney decided not to retry
Jennings. Id. at 33.
Following the Jennings’ trial, homophile activists largely retreated from the public sphere for the
remainder of the decade. See id. at 37–52 (reviewing turn to less confrontational politics). But see
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 115 (discussing One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam)
(reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the Postmaster of Los Angeles, California properly
refused to transmit a homosexual magazine because it was obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy), rev’g
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957)).
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to leave the ball alone, police turned up in force, photographing and
intimidating the guests.63 After the lawyers, who were there as observers,
asked for a warrant before allowing the police to enter, the police arrested
the lawyers.64 The ball took place in The Tenderloin, a San Francisco
neighborhood that the police considered to be home to homosexuals,
prostitutes, drag queens, and other alleged perverts. After the ACLU helped
the lawyers fight the criminal charges, the lawyers filed their own civil suit
against the city alleging violation of their civil rights.65 CRH used the lawsuit
to raise publicity about police harassment and to challenge the
characterization of lesbians and gays as sexual perverts.66 Other homophile
organizations formed legal committees and incorporated litigation into other
work on police harassment,67 immigration exclusions,68 criminal law
reform,69 and federal government employment practices.70
On August 29, 1956, Frank Kameny was arrested after undercover police
observed another man fondling Kameny’s genitals in a San Francisco
restroom.71 Kameny pleaded guilty, paid his fine and served his probation,
and thought that the incident was resolved. But in December 1957, Kameny
was dismissed from his job at the U.S. Army Map Service after they learned
of his earlier arrest.72 Kameny fought his dismissal all the way to the

63
64
65
66

67
68

69

70
71

72

D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 193–94.
Id.
See Letter from Marshall Krause, ACLU staff lawyer, to Morris Lowenthal (May 19, 1965) (on file
with San Francisco Public Library, Evander Smith Papers).
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 193–94; ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS 1945–1990: AN ORAL HISTORY 147–65 (1992) (interviews
with lawyers).
See Pearl Hart, Know Your Rights (1965) (unpublished brochure written for Mattachine Society)
(on file with author).
See D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 197 (discussing the establishment of the North American Conference
of Homophile Organizations, which funded court cases that dealt with, inter alia, the exclusion of
homosexual immigrants).
The North American Conference of Homophile Organizations (“NACHO") formed a Committee
on Legal Affairs primarily to reform criminal law with regard to homosexuality. Letter from
Franklin E. Kameny to Austin Wade (May 23, 1969) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University, Arthur Warner Papers). For more information regarding how NACHO delegated
homophile initiatives between committees, see id.; Letter from Austin Wade to Franklin E. Kameny
(Apr. 28, 1969) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Arthur Warner Papers).
See Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823, 823–24 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (challenging the
appellant’s removal from the Army Map Service, an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense).
FRANKLIN E. KAMENY, PETITION DENIED, REVOLUTION BEGUN: THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF
KAMENY AT THE COURT: FRANK KAMENY’S PETITION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 5 (Charles Francis, ed. 2011) (ebook).
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 151.
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Supreme Court, filing a pro se certiorari petition in 1961.73 In his petition,
Kameny argued that exclusion from government employment “makes of the
homosexual a second-rate citizen, by discriminating against him without
reasonable cause.”74 According to Bill Eskridge, Kameny’s argument was
important because it ‘went beyond the liberal politics of privacy’ and made
an identity-based claim for equality.75 But it was an identity-based claim that
was still infused with sexuality: “[F]or those choosing voluntarily to engage
in homosexual acts, such acts are moral in a real and positive sense[.]”76
Following the denial of certiorari in his case, Kameny helped found the
Mattachine Society of Washington and a local affiliate of the ACLU, the
National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union.77 Kameny aggressively
pursued legal reform, representing dozens of lesbians and gays dismissed
from the military and other government employment in various
administrative hearings.78 While Kameny was not a lawyer himself, he
compiled records of how the government singled out gay sexual conduct.
When other lawyers criticized Kameny’s failure to emphasize the traditional
theories of administrative law, Kameny responded that most lawyers were
ill-equipped to describe the discrimination faced by lesbians and gays.79
Kameny’s response is important because it shows how he refused to accept
the idea that a turn to litigation had to mean dropping claims of sexuality.
For Kameny, the turn to litigation could be bold and confrontational,
especially when used to demand equality.

73

74
75
76
77
78

79

Initially, former California Congressman Byron N. Scott represented Kameny, filing a complaint
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and appealing the district court’s decision to
the U.S Court of Appeals. However, after losing in the Court of Appeals, Scott decided not to
represent Kameny in his appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead, Scott provided Kameny with a
sample Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and the Supreme Court rules so that Kameny could appeal
to the Supreme Court on his own. Charles Francis, Introduction to KAMENY, supra note 71, at 2–3.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 137.
Id. at 137–38.
KAMENY, supra note 71, at 8.
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 152, 155.
See id. at 152–53 (discussing Kameny’s activism); see also Letter from Alan Reitman to Frank
Kameny (July 1962) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, ACLU Papers) (responding
to Kameny’s criticisms of ACLU policy); letter from Frank Kameny to ACLU (Nov. 7, 1964) (on
file with Library of Congress, Kameny Papers) (outlining police harassment in gay bars); Letter
from Frank Kameny to ACLU (May 1966) (on file with Library of Congress, Kameny Papers)
(debating protections for government employees); Kameny Files, Library of Congress, containers
12-39 (records of Kameny’s representation of individuals in front of government agencies).
See Letter from Frank E. Kameny to Austin Wade, supra note 69 (“For example, my remarks
notwithstanding, I do not really dislike or look down upon lawyers; I just do not look up to them as
a class or group, and I feel that they need badly to be de-deified.”).
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B. National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties
Founded in 1970 by Arthur Warner “from the debris of the old NACHO
legal committee,” the National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties
(“NCSCL”) set legal reform as its explicit goal.80 This first attempt at
building a permanent legal organization, largely forgotten today, represents
a different vision of sexual civil liberties. NCSCL rejected the idea that there
are gay or straight issues, instead defining its legal reform agenda broadly as
including adultery, prostitution, solicitation, lewdness, and sodomy laws.81
Among its major litigation victories of the 1970s, it listed cases involving lewd
conduct, employment discrimination, prostitution, loitering for sexual
conduct, and sodomy.82
In addition to its rejection of the identity model, NCSCL differed from
modern LGBT legal organizations in its structure. Records describe a yearlong review process for proposed new members.83 NCSCL functioned as a
coalition, bringing together an “elite” group of lawyers and academics for
annual meetings to discuss sexual civil liberties.84 While interviewees
describe the process of adding new members as more informal, they agree
that Arthur Warner had to personally approve any new members.85
Despite its legal orientation, the majority of NCSCL members were
always non-lawyers and Arthur Warner himself was not licensed to practice
law.86 It described its primary mission as “the pursuit of sexual civil liberties
through education, both public and within the executive, legislative, judicial,
and administrative branches of government.”87 One of the key ways that
NCSCL carried this mission out was through the publication of the Sexual

80
81
82

83
84

85

86
87

See Advisory Letter on NCSCL (no date) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner
Papers).
See NCSCL Legal Report (1982) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers)
(“there are no ‘gay’ issues, there are no ‘straight’ issues, there are only sexual issues”).
See id. (citing Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Pryor v. Municipal Court,
599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979); Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal.
1979); People v. Norris, 152 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1978); People v. Gibson,
521 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1974)).
See NCSCL Legal Report, supra note 81.
Kosbie, supra note 49, at 107 (explaining that NCSCL functioned as a think tank and often held its
annual meeting in the same place as the American Bar Association).
Interview with Tom Coleman, former legal counsel, NCSCL, in L.A., Cal. (Aug. 26, 2013).
Interviewees also noted a concern with infiltration by the police. Interview with Jay Kohorn, former
legal counsel, NCSCL, in L.A., Cal. (Aug. 28, 2013).
One interviewee suggested that Warner’s commitment to sexual civil liberties might have resulted
from being denied access to the bar himself for an arrest. Interview with Jay Kohorn, supra note 85.
NCSCL Fact Sheet (no date) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers).
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Law Reporter. First published in 1975, the Reporter’s coverage matched the
breadth of NCSCL’s own mission.
NCSCL’s broad theory of sexual liberties carried through to the doctrinal
arguments that it made in court. Sodomy laws were objectionable on more
than just privacy grounds. Privacy would not reach NCSCL’s concern with
laws against prostitution, solicitation, and adultery. For example, in an early
major case, NCSCL’s brief argued that sodomy “statutes exist primarily to
punish, harass and otherwise denigrate the male homosexual, to make him
feel inferior, unworthy, and an outlaw of society.”88 The brief continued to
explain that sodomy laws prevent homosexuals from fulfilling their full sex
drive. It claimed violation of equal protection based on denying homosexuals
the only avenue to sexual satisfaction open to them.89 This theory of equal
protection, based upon sexual conduct rather than identity, is truly unique
and reflects NCSCL’s rejection of traditional identity politics. Even the
decision to highlight the connection between sexual conduct and dignity,
which LGBT legal groups would embrace decades later in a very different
context in Lawrence v. Texas, was radical for the time.90
Whereas LGBT legal groups are sometimes accused of hiding sexuality,
NCSCL very explicitly made a point of highlighting sexuality. It is easy to
dismiss this as a failed and forgotten style of organizing. By the early 1980s
NCSCL was beginning to fade as the present LGBT legal organizations grew
in size and strength.91 Its non-identarian organization model was eclipsed by
the new LGBT organizations. Lawyers organized in their own circles, rather
than through NCSCL. But NCSCL’s emphasis on a broad understanding
of sexual civil liberties did impact how we think about sodomy and the
eventual meaning of LGBT rights.
C. National Gay Task Force
Founded in 1973 as the first national gay rights political organization, the
National Gay Task Force (“NGTF”) played an active role in litigation into

88

89
90

91

Motion of N. Am. Conference of Homophile Orgs. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief
Amicus Curiae at 3, Buchanan v. Wade, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (No. 290). This brief was filed under
NACHO’s name by Walter Barnett, one of the key early leaders of NCSCL, and NCSCL claims
credit for working on Buchanan.
Id. at 4–5.
See Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of Petitioners at 16, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“Laws that brand gay people as criminally deviant do not
operate on some abstract ‘class.’ They harm real men and women . . . .”).
Interview with Tom Coleman, supra note 85.
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the early 1980s.92 The NGTF example is particularly important because it
challenges the idea that we should exclusively focus on the litigation-oriented
organizations to tell the history of LGBT rights.93 When we focus only on
litigation-oriented organizations, we can see the work happening in one
direction: They shape the stories that they tell in court to fit the doctrinal
categories that they work with. When we expand our story to include actors
like NGTF, we see how they started with the experiences of people on the
ground and shaped legal claims around that. The right to be sexual plays a
larger role in this story of the origins of LGBT rights. As we expand the
actors that we include in this history, we see a broader set of debates over
what would become LGBT rights.
NGTF adopted the LGBT-identity model that we are familiar with
today. They built networks at the local and state levels, giving them access
to lesbian and gay people in local communities across far more of the United
States than the legal organizations at the time.94 When NGTF learned of
cases of discrimination, it often played a key role in connecting LGBT people
to lawyers who could represent them.95 NGTF also served as a plaintiff in
several cases. For example, NGTF coordinated its efforts with Lambda
Legal in developing a challenge to the Federal Bureau of Prison’s treatment
of gay prisoners.96 In 1977, Lambda filed the litigation with NGTF as
plaintiff, challenging the prohibition of gay publications to prisoners.97
NGTF also played a key role in orchestrating an eventual Supreme Court
challenge to bans on gay teachers. In 1978, Oklahoma passed a law modeled
after the Briggs Initiative in California.98 The statute allowed the state to

92
93

94

95

96

97
98

NGTF later changed its name to The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and then to
The National LGBTQ Task Force. It is often referred to simply as “The Task Force.”
Cf. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Long, Broad, and Deep Civil Rights Movement: The Lessons of a Master Scholar
and Teacher, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY 140, 150–55 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R. B. Bernstein eds.,
2013) (describing how her understanding of “accommodationist” civil rights strategies shifted when
she studied lawyers outside the NAACP).
John D’Emilio, Organizational Tales: Interpreting the NGLTF Story, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 469, 473 (John D’Emilio, William B. Turner & Urvashi Vaid
eds., 2000).
See Letter from NGTF to NGTF Members (Mar. 23, 1981) (on file with Cornell University Library,
NGTF Files) (soliciting NGTF members who are teachers in Oklahoma to participate in NGTF v.
Oklahoma). Other records in this archival collection discuss this and other cases.
In 1980, the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund announced in its newsletter that the Bureau
of Prisons had “agreed to admit gay publications into federal prisons” under the settlement of NGTF
v. Carlson. For further discussion of the settlement, see Federal Bureau of Prisons Agrees to Admit Gay
Publications, NEWS FROM LAMBDA (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, NY),
Fall/Winter 1980, at 1.
Id.
Kosbie, supra note 49, at 127.
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dismiss public school teachers for engaging in or advocating “public
homosexual activity.”99 Using its networks, NGTF reached out to teachers
in Oklahoma who wanted to challenge the law.100 When it could not find
teachers willing to publicly put their name on a lawsuit for fear of reprisal,
NGTF became the plaintiff in a challenge to the law.101 NGTF provided
sworn affidavits that it represented the interests of its members who were
teachers in Oklahoma and had a real risk of being dismissed under this law.102
Working with NGRA and the ACLU, NGTF helped design the legal theories
in the challenge.103
While National Gay Rights Advocates (“GRA”) and the ACLU provided
the litigation expertise, NGTF itself initiated the lawsuit.104 NGTF played a
key role in identifying plaintiffs and developing the legal theories used in the
case.105 NGTF also reached out to the National Organization for Women,
the National Educational Association, and other groups, asking them to join
as amici or parties to the lawsuit.106 The Tenth Circuit held that the portion
of the law prohibiting advocacy of homosexual activity was
unconstitutionally vague,107 and the Supreme Court split 4-4 leaving the
ruling in place.108
In 1980, NGTF proposed a formal affiliation with a legal organization.
NGTF’s board expressed the goal of “creat[ing] a national capability to
coordinate the key functions of advocacy, litigation, and public education,
with a view towards developing effective strategies to secure the legal rights
and human dignity of lesbians and gay men.”109 While NGTF had good
relationships with the legal organizations at the time, board members raised
the concern that NGTF’s growing legal agenda demanded a more formal
relationship with a legal organization.110 Potential models for affiliation
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

110

Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1984).
Kosbie, supra note 49, at 131.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 128–32
See Helms Memo (June 18, 1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Files) (describing
NGTF’s early organizing against Oklahoma statute).
Kosbie, supra note 49, at 127-32.
Id. at 130
Nat’l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Nat’l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam). Justice
Powell took no part in the decision. Id.
See NGTF Board Resolution (Aug. 3, 1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Papers)
[hereinafter NGTF August Resolution]; NGRA Board Resolution (Jul. 12, 1980) (on file with
Cornell University Library, NGTF Papers) [hereinafter NGTF July Resolution] (using nearly
identical language).
See NGTF August Resolution, supra note 109.

.
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ranged from a formal advisory relationship to full merger.111 After all the
legal organizations at the time responded to its proposal, NGTF entered
serious merger discussions with GRA.112 The proposed merger ultimately
failed, but it is important because it suggests a different way of doing LGBT
rights.
D. The New LGBT Legal Organizations
When the major LGBT legal organizations were founded in the 1970s,
they marked something new. It was the first time that litigation-oriented
organizations openly dedicated themselves to protecting lesbian and gay
people. But what did it mean to litigate on behalf of lesbian and gay rights?
The new LGBT legal organizations drew on existing models of public
interest legal organizations as they defined their own organizational
identities, or sense of “who we are” and “what we do.”113 But these
organizations also experimented with different legal theories and different
ideas about what it meant to represent LGBT people.114 By paying close
attention to how these new organizations defined their work, I argue that we
get more insight into how the right to be sexual was intertwined with LGBT
rights as LGBT rights emerged as a category.
In the early 1970s, Bill Thom responded to a request for legal aid from
the Gay Activists Alliance (“GAA”) in New York City. As a lawyer at a midsize firm in the city, Thom was on track to become a partner and was not out
at work. Thom explained that he initially ignored the request, sent to all
lawyers subscribed to a bar association list for legal aid requests, but
111
112

113

114

See id.
While the board resolutions from NGTF and NGRA confirm the seriousness of the proposal, no
one that I interviewed remembers it. This suggests that NGTF did not entertain the possibility of
a merger for long after the initial proposal failed.
See generally Stephen M. Engel, Organizational Identity as a Constraint on Strategic Action: A Comparative
Analysis of Gay and Lesbian Interest Groups, 21 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 66 (2007) (describing and
comparing the organizational structures and advocacy choices of several prominent LGBT interest
groups in the 1990s).
Organizational identity includes an organization’s membership
demographics, internal self-view, and its external reputation. Id. at 67–68. Identity helps establish
an organization’s niche in a broader field. Id. The identities of the LGBT legal organizations were
shaped by the availability of a model of public interest legal organizations. See id. at 75–81
(providing a historical overview of two nationally prominent gay and lesbian interest groups and
describing their models for success). Beginning in 1969, the number of public interest legal
organizations expanded rapidly, creating a public recognition of the idea of a “public interest” law
firm. Hilbink, supra note 43, at 317; see also Ann Southworth, What is Public Interest Law? Empirical
Perspectives on an Old Question, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2013) (tracing continued expansion of
use of “public interest” label).
I do not include the ACLU in my discussion, but it also played a key role in developing LGBT legal
field. See Kosbie, supra note 49, at 182–225 (explaining the ACLU’s involvement in LGBT rights).
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responded several months later when the request was still open. After seeing
how the Fordham law student in charge of the GAA legal committee
struggled to run the committee, Thom decided to found a gay legal defense
and education fund.115 He chose the name “Lambda” because it was already
associated with LGBT culture, but would not raise the same attention from
outsiders as a name that included “Gay” or “Lesbian.”116 Nonetheless facing
criticism from his law firm, Bill Thom resigned and later opened his own law
firm with Cary Boggan.117 In the early years of the organization, Lambda
operated out of a board member’s living room and later out of Boggan and
Thom’s law offices. At monthly board meetings (the board was the entirety
of the organization), members debated how to best respond to incoming
requests for aid.
Lambda Legal most directly followed the public interest legal model from
when it was first founded. Bill Thom copied its charter application from the
Puerto Rican Education and Defense Legal Fund, the most recently founded
legal fund in New York City prior to Lambda.118 Even in 1977, Lambda’s
newsletter talked about the importance of “test case litigation” to Lambda’s
mission.119 These early newsletters defined its mission in terms of
discrimination “perpetuated by the American legal system.”120
Lambda also moved to secure its identity as representing the full LGBT
community. Although Bill Thom initially chose the name Lambda because
it avoided the higher profile of the words Gay or Lesbian, by 1980 Lambda
was readily recognized as a gay organization.121 In 1980, Lambda
announced that it had just hired a new national board of directors.122 And
in 1983, Lambda broadened its litigation priorities to include family and
relationships (issues more important to lesbians at the time) and the first
AIDS discrimination case in the nation.123

115
116
117

118
119
120
121
122
123

Interview with Bill Thom, Founder of Lambda Legal, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 11, 2013).
Id.
Id. Shepherd Raimi explains that, after starting Lambda, the partners at Thom’s firm told him that
if he were to run Lambda Legal, he would not have the time required to make partner. Interview
with Shepherd Raimi, Original Board Member of Lambda Legal, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 14, 2013).
Interview with Bill Thom, supra note 115.
See Counseling, 2 LAMBDA NEWS 1, 2 (Apr. 1977) (“Test case litigation or other matters likely to affect
gay people as a group is the function for which Lambda was created . . . .”).
Purpose, LAMBDA: NEWS FROM LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC. (Lambda Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Sept./Oct. 1979, at 2.
Interview with Bill Thom, supra note 115.
Lambda Elects New National Board of Directors, NEWS FROM LAMBDA, supra note 96, at 1, 3.
Lambda Fights the First AIDS Lawsuit to Reach Court, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1983, at 1–2; Lambda Adopts New Priority, LAMBDA UPDATE, supra,
at 2.
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The founding story of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
(“GLAD”) is more radical but similarly starts with one person. In 1977, John
Ward opened his law office in Boston and began advertising in Gay Community
News as a lawyer serving the gay community.124 He explained that he was
the first openly gay male lawyer in Boston.125 After a series of arrests of gay
men for lewd conduct at the Boston Public Library, Ward decided to open
GLAD in 1978.126 Ward’s connections with Gay Community News played a key
role in shaping GLAD. Most of the early board members and staff of GLAD
came from Gay Community News, which had a reputation for radical politics,
even with the gay community.127 GLAD’s board and staff shared this radical
politics. To GLAD, defending gay men arrested in sex stings was not simply
a matter of demanding to be left alone by the police; it was also a demand
for the state to reorganize police practices to protect lesbians and gays. Early
newsletters defined their goal as defending cases “in our own words” in
court.128
GLAD did not start out as explicitly focused on impact litigation. Instead,
it grew out of John Ward’s defense of individual gay men arrested in sex
stings in Boston.129 But as the organization grew, it increasingly defined itself
in similar terms of impact litigation on behalf of the LGBT community.
GLAD distinguished itself as a New England specific organization. Kevin
Cathcart, as then-executive director of GLAD, made an agreement that
GLAD would work in the New England states while Lambda could work in
the rest of the country. When Cathcart became executive director of
Lambda, he continued to honor this agreement, cementing GLAD’s regional
identity.130
GRA was originally the brainchild of Hastings law students Matt Coles,
Jerel McCrary, and Bruce Coplen.131 Before graduating from law school in
1977, the three discussed forming a public interest law firm for LGBT issues.
Matt Coles solicited interest and funding from prominent gay political
activists. While most were sympathetic, they did not think the time was right

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Interview with John Ward, Founder of GLAD, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 21, 2013).
Id.
John Ward explained that these police entrapment cases were paying the bills for his private law
firm as well. In one case, he represented the predecessor organization to NAMBLA. Id.
Interview with Cindy Rizzo, Former Board Member, GLAD, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2013).
Kosbie, supra note 49, at 125 (explaining language used in early GLAD publications).
Interview with John Ward, supra note 124.
Interview with Kevin Cathcart, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, Former Executive Director,
GLAD, in N.Y., N.Y. (Sept. 12, 2013).
Interview with Matt Coles, Director, Center for Equality, ACLU, Former Founding Member of
GRA, in S.F., Cal. (May 31, 2012). GRA would later become National Gay Rights Advocates.
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for the new organization. Eventually Richard Rouillard became involved
and agreed to help fund the new organization.132 Rouillard was embittered
over rejection by his family and set out to create a “gay ACLU.”133 On
January 1, 1978, GRA and the private law firm of “Coles, Knutson &
McCrary” simultaneously opened their doors at 540 Castro Street in San
Francisco.134 The goal was to take paying cases through the private law firm
and use the profit to support the public interest work of GRA. Donald
Knutson was a law professor at USC and was the most prominent of the
founders. By bringing him in as legal director, the founders of GRA hoped
to attract prominent gay political activists to serve on GRA’s board and
support the new organization.135
When this public-private model failed, the private law firm split off from
GRA.136 Later battles over Don Knutson’s leadership style led to a complete
staff reorganization, with Jean O’Leary coming on board as Executive
Director in 1981. O’Leary was not a lawyer and served as the NGTF’s
director before coming to GRA. Because of this, she brought a media-savvy
style to GRA. Until its close in 1991, GRA remained more openly political
than the other LGBT legal organizations. Lawyers at GRA stressed the
importance of public education. According to Leonard Graff, there were so
few victories in the 1980s that they were less concerned with setting bad
precedent. While they wanted to win their cases, the ability of a case to
generate positive media attention was a key consideration for them.137 For
example, in 1988 GRA sued the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) for failing to approve
AIDS drugs fast enough.138 Outsiders criticized this lawsuit as a publicityraising stunt with no chance of success. While recognizing the limited chance
of success in the courtroom, GRA argued that the lawsuit could play an
important role in bringing media attention to the responsibilities of the FDA

132

133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, Executive Vice President of Legal Affairs, 20 th
Century Fox (discussing Rouillard’s involvement with NGRA). Matt Coles specifically met with
Frank Kameny and Bruce Voeller, amongst others. Coles explained that he saw the legal work as
always political. Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131.
Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, supra note 132.
Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131. 540 Castro Street was directly across the street from
Harvey Milk’s camera shop. Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, supra note 132.
Interview with Jerel McCrary (May 13, 2014).
Id.
Interview with Leonard Graff, Former Legal Director, NGRA, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 21, 2013).
See Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Civ. A. No. 87–1735,
1988 WL 43833, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1988) (dismissing case filed by NGRA alleging drugs used
to treat AIDS were unavailable to patients in the U.S. because the United States engaged in
irrational and irresponsible conduct.).
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and NIH.139 After the FDA changed some of its policies, GRA claimed that
its lawsuit played a key role.
GRA similarly worked to build an identity as a national impact litigation
organization. Originally founded as GRA, in 1983, it became National Gay
Rights Advocates (“NGRA”), laying a claim to nation-wide impact.140 While
its legal work was well-respected, NGRA also had a reputation for “shooting
from the hip” at times.141 Lawyers at the other LGBT legal organizations
respected the work that NGRA did, but they also questioned some of the
litigation as either too risky or as a media ploy. But NGRA embraced this
image, describing the “aggressive legal posture” that the organization
preferred.142 NGRA lawyers described the importance of positive media
coverage to achieving sociolegal change and required plaintiffs to allow
NGRA to use their names in media coverage.143 This media-savvy style is
not necessarily inconsistent with the LGBT rights we think of today, but it
does present a different style of doing them.
In 1973, Wendy Williams, Nancy Davis, and Mary Dunlap founded
Equal Rights Advocates (“ERA”) as an explicitly feminist legal organization
in San Francisco.144 While not explicitly an LGBT legal organization, ERA
was deeply concerned with the discrimination facing lesbians. In 1974,
Donna Hitchens interned for ERA while a law student. Through her work
at ERA, Hitchens was embedded in feminist political networks. Prior to
graduating law school, Hitchens applied for a grant from UC Berkeley,
received funding, and opened Lesbian Rights Project under the umbrella of
the ERA in November of 1977.145 She explained that other gay lawyers out
there (predominantly men) marginalized child custody and other issues
particularly affecting lesbians.146 LRP was thus founded with an explicitly
lesbian feminist philosophy. In a 1980 letter, Hitchens explained that LRP
139
140

141
142
143
144
145

146

See Memo from Ben Schatz (May 1988) (on file with author).
Name Change, . . . INTO CTS.: NEWSL. NAT’L GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates,
S.F., Cal.), Summer 1983, at 1, 3; see also Interview with Leonard Graff, supra note 137 (discussing
the name change of NGRA).
Interview with Jon Davidson (Aug. 24, 2013) (discussing NGRA’s reputation and its legal strategy
compared to other organizations).
See Board Minutes (Oct. 1984) (on file with author) (describing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
See id. (describing policy on plaintiff name usage); see also Interview with Leonard Graff, supra
note 137 (explaining GRA’s relationship with the media).
See CAIN, supra note 31, at 65. Mary Dunlap would later work for NGRA and the ACLU at different
times and played a key role in LGBT legal organizing.
Interview with Donna Hitchens, Founder, Lesbian Rights Project, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 29, 2013).
Hitchens also explained that it was important to her to work for a legal-specific organization. A lot
of her work was embedded in feminist networks rather than LGBT networks.
Id.
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would accept almost any case on behalf of a lesbian where her sexual
orientation was a major issue.147 LRP eventually became an independent
organization and changed its name to the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, but it maintained its lesbian feminist philosophy. When LRP was
founded, it did not have the same impact mission as the other organizations.
Simply taking cases on behalf of lesbians was a form of impact.148 But as it
established positive precedents in its core areas of custody and family issues,
LRP increasingly focused on impact litigation.
1. How the LGBT Legal Organizations Talked About Litigation
The dockets of the LGBT legal organizations in the late 1970s and early
1980s included a diverse range of issues, including immigration reform,
military discharges, employment discrimination, family and child custody,
local nondiscrimination ordinances, prisoners’ rights, and education. I use
three specific cases to examine how the LGBT legal organizations talked
about their litigation. From these cases, we see that the LGBT legal
organizations did not start out with an image of what constituted LGBT
rights. They started from instances of how the state infringed on sexual
dignity and autonomy. Both the right to be sexual and LGBT rights offered
ways to describe the connections between these cases.
In a key early case, Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,149 LRP
“asserted that it was a denial of equal protection . . . for heterosexual state
employees to be able to provide dental coverage for their spouses when
homosexual state employees were unable to provide similar coverage for the
family partners.”150 Hinman began after Boyce Hinman’s 1981 application
for dental coverage including his partner of twelve years, Larry Beatty, was
rejected by the state agency that he worked for.151 Regulations for the state
dental plan limited coverage to a state employee’s spouse and unmarried
children.152
It is tempting to see Hinman as a precursor to modern same-sex marriage
cases. Viewed that way, it seems like a building block of LGBT rights. But
LRP did not argue for a right to same-sex marriage. Instead, it argued that
147
148
149
150
151
152

See Letter from LRP to NGTF (1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Files) (noting
exception of when a lesbian could pay for a case).
Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145.
213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
Fair Treatment for Our Families, LESBIAN RTS. PROJECT (Lesbian Rights Project, S.F., Cal.), 1983,
at 1.
Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
Id. at 413–14.
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the state discriminated based on marital status.153 In its newsletters, the LRP
would consistently explain that the state privileged marriage over other
family forms.154 Rather than claim that lesbians and gays were just like
everyone else, it argued that lesbian and gay families should be respected on
their own terms. People should be able to make choices about their sexual
and family lives without coercion from the state’s preference for marriage as
a family form.155
Arguments based on privacy and a demand to be left alone by the state
were a weak fit in litigation involving prisons. In May, 1977, Lambda Legal
initiated NGTF v. Carlson, challenging the policy of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“FBOP”), which excluded gay publications from prisons.156 The first
step for Lambda was to travel across the country, taking depositions from
prison wardens. The FBOP denied any uniform policy on gay publications,
so these depositions would establish the existence of a ban and document
how the ban functioned.157
Prisoners do not give up all of their constitutional rights, but their claims
to rights are balanced against the goals of prison administration.158 Thus,
typical claims of privacy or LGBT rights would not get far in NGTF v. Carlson.
Lambda could not simply argue that the prison should leave gay prisoners
alone or that gay prisoners were just like other prisoners. Tolerance and
equality were part of the case, but Lambda also had to assert the moral
integrity of gay identities. Lambda had to argue that the FBOP policy was
harmful to gay prisoners. One lawyer explained that litigation like Carlson
took on “highly visible government programs where we were clearly secondclass citizens.”159
Another area where we see this tension between the right to be sexual
and LGBT rights is in immigration. On June 13, 1979, Carl Hill and his
lover arrived at San Francisco International airport to cover the Gay
153

154

155
156
157
158

159

See id. at 415 (“[P]laintiffs argue the term ‘spouse’ is not neutral as to homosexuals, and is not merely
a classification based on marital status, but one based on sexual orientation.”). Notably, LRP did
not argue for a right to same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Pursuing Equal Employment Benefits for Gay and Lesbian Family Partners, LESBIAN RTS. PROJECT
(Lesbian Rights Project, S.F., Cal.), 1983, at 7 (pursuing litigation in which the state privileges
married couples and not same-sex couples).
For a full articulation of this theory, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008).
Federal Bureau of Prisons Agrees to Admit Gay Publications, supra note 96, at 1.
Id.
See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citation omitted) (“Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not retain
rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.”).
Interview with Leonard Graff, supra note 137.
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Freedom Day Parade for the London Gay News.160 Because Hill wore a gay
pride button, he was required to undergo a psychiatric examination by the
Public Health Service (“PHS”).161 NGRA intervened, arguing that after
homosexuality was declassified as a mental illness in 1973, PHS could no
longer certify it as a “physical or mental defect or disease” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.162 In response to the pressure from this
case, the Surgeon General issued an order on August 2, 1979 preventing the
PHS from issuing the required “medical certificates solely because an alien
[was] suspected of being homosexual.”163
Hill returned to the United States on November 5, 1980. This time Hill
made an unsolicited declaration of his homosexuality to the immigration
officials when he entered the country. Hill’s statement deliberately provoked
the new policy of Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) of only
enforcing the ban on lesbians and gays when they openly admitted their
sexuality.164 NGRA again stood by to challenge INS’s new attempt to bar
Hill from entering the United States Now, NGRA argued that INS could
not exclude an immigrant based on their sexuality without a medical
certificate from the PHS, even if the immigrant openly declared their
sexuality.165 NGRA argued that Congress intended for INS to defer to PHS
in determining when immigrants should be barred for medical reasons.
Several years earlier in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “psychopathic personality” in the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a term of art intended to exclude
homosexuals from the United States.166 One way to view NGRA’s litigation
160
161

162
163

164

165

166

Litigation—National, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights Advocates, S.F.,
Cal.), Oct. 1979, at 1.
Id. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens with mental and physical disabilities
including affliction “with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or mental defect[,]” could
be excluded from entry into the United States. Hill v. U.S. Immigration & Nationalization Serv.,
714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976)).
Litigation—National, supra note 160, at 1–2.
Hill, 714 F.2d at 1472; see also Litigation—National, supra note 160, at 2 (“INS lifted its order that Hill
submit to the examination immediately after the U.S. Surgeon General issued a directive forbidding
certification of homosexual aliens as excludable.”).
See Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citation omitted) (explaining that the INS adopted a new policy which
allowed an immigration official to examine an alien if the alien “makes an unambiguous oral or
written admission of homosexuality”).
See id. at 1474 (“The issue presented is whether the INS may exclude self-declared homosexual
aliens without medical certification of psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or mental
defect.”).
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967). For a discussion on
early twentieth century immigration law, which excluded aliens for sexual perversions, see
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 19–54 (2009).

1416

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:5

involving Carl Hill is as a narrow attack on Boutilier: If the PHS would not
certify lesbians and gays as psychopathic, then they could not be excluded.
Under this narrow view, the litigation would be limited to interpreting a
single statute and would do little for LGBT rights and nothing for the right
to be sexual. Because Carl Hill was not a U.S. citizen, NGRA’s lawsuit could
only challenge INS procedure, not the underlying immigration policy
itself.167 NGRA’s lawsuit did not directly contend that the state could not
exclude homosexuals.168 Despite the narrow legal arguments used, NGRA
and Carl Hill always understood these cases through the broader justification
of establishing the “good moral character” of LGBT people.169 NGRA
explained that they knew the litigation turned on the court seeing the dignity
of LGBT people as much as the formal legal arguments.
These broader justifications influenced the tone of the judicial opinions.
NGRA’s December 1980 Newsletter quoted the initial decision of the
immigration judge to admit Carl Hill to the country:
When a person is, in effect, diagnosed as not normal or insane, he thereby
becomes less than human with the inevitable result that he is not entitled to
the same human rights as the sane or normal. This, of course, obscures from
consideration his civil rights and liberties. Our legal system does not relieve
us of the responsibility to consider a person’s rights on the basis of his foreign
citizenship.170

NGRA embraced the national and international media attention that the
case produced, and in May 1983, officials from NGRA, Gay Rights National
Lobby, and NGTF met with Reagan administration officials to discuss
changes to immigration laws regarding lesbians and gays.171
What emerges from these cases is not a well-planned agenda to achieve
LGBT rights or the right to be sexual. Instead, the LGBT legal organizations
167

168

169

170
171

See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 541 F.
Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (citation omitted) (“Because he was an alien having no
constitutional right to enter the United States, Hill was unable to directly challenge the propriety
of excluding homosexuals from entry.”).
See Matter of Hill, 18 I. & N. Dec. 81, 82 (1981) (noting that the exclusion hearing focused on
whether the applicant could be excluded without a certification stating that he was within an
excluded class).
GRA Enters Two New Cases, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights
Advocates, S.F., Cal.), Summer 1982, at 1 (discussing In re Longstaff, a case filed by the NGRA in
which the petitioner was “denied naturalization simply because he is gay and therefore lacks the
requisite ‘good moral character’”).
Litigation Report, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights Advocates, S.F.,
Cal.), Dec. 1980, at 1, 2.
NGRA Meets with Reagan Administration Officials, . . . INTO CTS.: NEWSL. NAT’L GAY RTS. ADVOCATES
(Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates, S.F., Cal.), Summer 1983, at 1, 3; see also Litigation Report, supra
note 170, at (“The Hill case has brought us important grants from foundations and has provided
us with international media attention.”).
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constantly articulated new justifications and demands on the state across a
range of issues and legal venues. I argue against any monolithic
understanding of LGBT lawyers falling trap to the allure of the right to be
left alone as the ultimate goal. The right to be left alone is justified by a
demand for tolerance but falls short of full equality.172 But some of the
strongest criticisms of this assimilationist logic come from within the LGBT
legal movement. Recognizing the broader project of a right to be sexual
shapes how we understand the history of LGBT litigation.
2. National Educational Foundation for Individual Rights
When we turn to how the LGBT legal organizations began to organize
their work together, we see further evidence that our present-day
understanding of LGBT rights misses how the right to be sexual was part of
their work. The founding papers for the National Educational Foundation
for Individual Rights (“NEFIR”) were signed at a February 1979 conference
on “Law and the Fight for Gay Rights,” hosted at NYU Law.173 Donna
Hitchens, the founder of LRP, explained that the idea for NEFIR probably
originated more informally out of discussions between the lawyers at the
different organizations suggesting that they needed some sort of coordinating
mechanism for their work. NEFIR included GLAD, LRP, NGRA, Lambda
Legal, the Texas Human Rights Foundation (“THRF”), and a small number
of independent lawyers and law professors.174 While NEFIR would explicitly
work on “gay rights litigation,” its goals also included “the basic right to
sexual expression . . . and private sexual conduct.”175
Grant applications to support NEFIR describe the umbrella organization
in grandiose terms. One proposed budget for 1979 was over $100,000,
greater than the budget of any of the individual LGBT legal organizations at
the time.176 These applications described the purpose of NEFIR as
172
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See SUZANNE DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES, AND GOOD
INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY 256–75 (2014) (contrasting tolerance with a robust
claim to full civil rights and integration).
Rutgers Law and Lambda Legal also supported this conference. See Invitation to Conference on
Law and the Fight for Gay Rights (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner
Papers). I have not found any record of a discussion about NEFIR at this conference, but two
interviewees independently remember this conference as where the papers were first signed.
Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131; Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145. On
May 2, 1979, NEFIR became a California non-profit corporation and later that year it received
tax-exempt status from both the state and federal government. See Report to Playboy Foundation
(1979) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Records).
See Report to Playboy Foundation, supra note 173.
NEFIR Project ‘81 Proposal (1981) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files).
See NEFIR Proposal (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files).
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overseeing and coordinating the work and fundraising of all the legal
organizations. Despite this grand language, the LGBT legal organizations
never intended to cede autonomy to NEFIR. Instead, the grant language
was designed to appeal to funders.177 The LGBT legal organizations did
agree, however, that NEFIR would play a role in developing a legal resource
bank and coordinating meetings between the organizations.178
NEFIR quickly won a $15,000 grant from the Playboy Foundation.179
Created in 1965, the Playboy Foundation supports work related to human
sexuality, reproductive health, freedom of speech, and civil rights.180 In the
1970s, it was one of the only foundations willing to support work related to
homosexuality.181 Using the money from Playboy, NEFIR set out to develop
a resource bank to include copies of relevant briefs, court decisions, expert
witness reports, law review articles, and any other relevant materials. NGRA
took on the project of collecting material for the resource center, and NEFIR
entered discussions with Golden Gate University Law School about locating
the library there.182
In addition to the resource bank, NEFIR also funded GLAD’s work
compiling a lesbian and gay attorney referral guide. This referral guide was
a resource for the LGBT legal organizations themselves (allowing them to
refer out cases that they could not handle on their own) as well as to the
broader LGBT community. Ultimately, GLAD published several versions
of the guide, although later versions were after the demise of NEFIR.183
Despite its ambitious beginnings, NEFIR soon collapsed. Fights over
organizational autonomy seem to have played a key role in the collapse of
NEFIR. While many of the organizations involved supported the idea of
having a central organization to fundraise for coordinated projects, they also
wanted to continue their own fundraising work. NEFIR rules prohibited the

177
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Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145.
See NEFIR Board Minutes (Oct. 13, 1979) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files)
(agreeing to solicit proposals for resource bank); Minutes of Conference Call (Apr. 19, 1983) (on file
with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (discussing Lambda’s role in organizing conference calls
and other meetings).
See NEFIR Project ‘81 Proposal, supra note 175.
See Playboy Foundation, SOCIETY FOR NONPROFITS, https://www.snpo.org/publications/fundingal
ert_details.php?id=1988.
See Kosbie, supra note 49, at 208 (discussing Playboy Foundation support for the ACLU’s Sexual
Privacy Project in 1973 and for NGTF’s challenges to exclusions of gays from the military in 1978).
See Correspondence Between NEFIR Members (1981-82) (on file with Yale University Library,
GLAD Files) (discussing problems with locating resource library at Golden Gate). Despite extensive
discussion with Golden Gate, it does not appear that any materials were ever transferred there.
See, e.g., Letter from Richard Burns, Board Member, GLAD, to NEFIR Board Members (Aug. 13,
1981) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (discussing GLAD’s progress on guide).
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LGBT legal organizations from applying for independent funding from any
grant agency that NEFIR applied to.184
By early 1983, discussions shifted from how to organize NEFIR’s activity
to how to dismantle NEFIR.185 While the lawyers involved criticized how
NEFIR itself worked, they agreed that some of its coordinating functions
were critical to the success of the emerging LGBT legal field.186 Ultimately,
GLAD maintained control of the attorney referral guide and Lambda Legal
continued coordinating the conference calls between the organizations.
NGRA appears to have kept the legal material it gathered for the resource
bank, but there is no clear record of what happened to these materials. The
LGBT legal organizations also agreed to maintain the corporate shell of
NEFIR to be used to facilitate a potential future LGBT legal conference.187
Several years later, Lavender Law would use NEFIR to handle the
fundraising and finances for its first annual conference.188 As Matt Coles
explained, “NEFIR was sort of the early exploration of the idea of trying to
get the legal groups coordinated and pooling resources.”189 Reflecting the
humor of the time, Matt also noted that they used to say “When will we
succeed? NEFIR!”190
III. SODOMY REFORM AND THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL
Why did sodomy reform become central to the work of the LGBT legal
field? This question is rarely asked in other scholarship. Sodomy reform and
the right to privacy are largely taken for granted as the foundation for LGBT
rights.191 Courts deciding same-sex marriage cases today cite back to
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See, e.g., Letter from Rosayln Richter, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, to NEFIR Board
Members (May 23, 1980) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (explaining that
Lambda will still apply to Playboy Foundation despite NEFIR’s applications there).
See, e.g., Minutes of GLAD Board of Directors Meeting (Mar. 1983) (on file with Yale University
Library, GLAD Files) (“The discussion in SF was slanted towards NEFIR not continuing to exist”).
See, e.g., Letter from Tim Sweeney, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, to NEFIR Board Members
(May 20, 1983) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (identifying critical functions of
NEFIR that should be preserved).
Donna Hitchens of LRP agreed to maintain the NEFIR shell. See Handwritten Notes (1983) (on file
with Yale University Library, GLAD Files).
See Lavender Law Steering Committee Minutes (Jul. 1988) (on file with GLBT Historical Society,
Donna Hitchens Papers). See also Letter from Bill Weinberger (May 25, 1988) (on file with ONE
National Gay and Lesbian Archives, Weinberger Papers) (asking for donations payable to NEFIR).
Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131.
Id.
See infra Part II for discussion of historical foundation of LGBT rights.
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Lawrence and Hardwick as they analyze the claims of LGBT rights.192 A rich
doctrinal scholarship analyzes these cases, identifying the various
assumptions that they make about the cultural meaning of privacy.193
Scholars tell the legal history of LGBT rights through the prism of sodomy
reform.194 There is good reason for this. Sodomy reform was at or near the
top of the agenda for LGBT legal organizations by the 1970s. But forgotten
in all of this is that sodomy reform was not only about litigation and not only
about the right to be left alone. My organizational approach to studying the
emergence of LGBT rights forces us to ask why sodomy reform became
central to the work of the LGBT legal field. What emerges is that LGBT
activists brought multiple strategies and motivations to bear on their early
sodomy reform work. The right to be sexual was as important of an
organizing principle as the right to be left alone.
In the most detailed study of sodomy laws, Bill Eskridge “traces the rise,
evolution, decline, and fall of the crime against nature[.]”195 Eskridge
attributes the changing regulation of sodomy to interactions between social
movements and cultural, political, and constitutional values. Challenging
192
193

194
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See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
sexual orientation jurisprudence and specifically analyzing the holdings in Hardwick and Lawrence).
Following Hardwick, scholars analyzed the meaning of privacy and identified new arguments to
protect LGBT rights despite the setback from Hardwick. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick,
27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 533 (1992) (undertaking a “gay-friendly deconstruction of the
new sexual orientation categories” under Equal Protection despite the holding in Hardwick); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 799–802 (1989) (reframing the injury of
sodomy laws as the imposition of a heterosexual sexual identity upon lesbians and gays). Following
Lawrence, scholars again analyzed the meaning of privacy, now in relation to morality and other
areas of the law. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage
in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1185 (2004) (arguing that “Lawrence
is neither irrelevant . . . nor dispositive” to the question of same-sex marriage); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1233, 1233–36 (2004) (arguing Lawrence only prevents use of explicit morals-based
justifications for the law); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899 (2004) (using Lawrence to explore meaning of
substantive due process and protection of human dignity). Feminist and queer criticisms of Lawrence
questioned the limits of privacy for protecting sexual rights. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, The Road
Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1090 (2004) (claiming that
“[p]rivacy works to protect systemic inequality . . .” produced by sexual violence and patriarchy);
Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights versus Queer Theory: What is Left of Sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas?, 23
SOC. TEXT 235, 239 (2005) (“The Court, and the Constitution, will respect our sex lives, but on
condition that our sex lives be respectable.”).
See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 27, at 169–253 (spending several chapters on development and impact of
Hardwick); see generally CARPENTER, supra note 39 (discussing legal, political, and cultural factors
influencing legal strategies in Lawrence); ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 15 (discussing “[t]he initial
struggle . . . to protect private gay spaces”); Ellen Ann Andersen, The Stages of Sodomy Reform, 23 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 283, 318 (1998) (analyzing the phases of sodomy reform).
ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 2.
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the idea that sodomy laws always regulated same-sex intimacy, Eskridge
shows how following World War II, states added stiffer criminal penalties for
sodomy and made their laws increasingly gay-specific.196 Beginning in 1955,
many states established commissions to modernize their criminal codes.197
Several states decriminalized sodomy or reduced the penalties for it as part
of this process. But in 1969, Kansas became the first state to criminalize
sodomy for only same-sex conduct.198 Nonetheless, until 1980, LGBT
activists continued to have some success with legislative decriminalization of
sodomy.199
This explains why sodomy reform was not obvious as the goal of LGBT
rights when the modern LGBT legal organizations were founded. Reform
was ongoing in state legislatures and it was not yet clear if that effort would
succeed. My organizational analysis reveals that it was also not clear how
sodomy reform would advance other goals of the LGBT legal organizations.
Thus, rather than telling the story of how sodomy reform was the starting
point for LGBT rights, we need to tell the story of how LGBT rights emerged
and was shaped by debates over sodomy reform and the right to be sexual.
A. Sodomy Roundtables
On November 20, 1983, the “Ad Hoc Task Force to Challenge Sodomy
Law” first met at the ACLU’s offices in New York City.200 Organized by
Abby Rubenfeld of Lambda Legal (who rented office space from the ACLU
at the time), the Task Force included representatives from Lambda, GLAD,
NGRA, LRP, THRF, NCSCL, and lawyers from several ACLU offices. The
Task Force’s goals included developing litigation strategies to overturn
sodomy laws, providing information to lawyers working on relevant cases,
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197
198
199

200

See id. at 88–108 (tracing change in sodomy laws between 1935 and 1961). This book builds on
Eskridge’s historical analysis in an earlier article, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and
Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631 (1999). Eskridge was a primary author on the amicus brief
filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Cato Institute in Lawrence v. Texas, and the brief relies
heavily on a historical analysis of sodomy statutes. Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 9–16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
For an in-depth discussion of state initiatives regarding sodomy laws, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 36,
at 73-108.
Id. at 165.
See Andersen, supra note 194, at 297 (explaining that between 1971 and 1983, “the course of sodomy
reform proceeded mainly through legislative reform and only secondarily through litigation”);
Melinda D. Kane, Timing Matters: Shifts in the Causal Determinants of Sodomy Law Decriminalization, 1961–
1998, 54 SOC. PROBS. 211, 213 (2007) (noting that around 1980, the decriminalizing sodomy
movement shifted from the legislative arena to the courts).
Lambda and ACLU Hold Conference on Sodomy Laws, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1984, at 1, 3.
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and advertising the existence of the Task Force to gay men and lesbians who
might be arrested for sodomy.201 Rubenfeld explained that she chose to host
the meetings at the ACLU offices partially to secure the legitimacy afforded
by the ACLU name.202
The roundtables, as the Task Force soon came to be known, played a key
role in producing movement cohesion.203 Meeting two or three times a year,
these roundtables provided a space for lawyers to debate constitutional
theories for sodomy reform and share emerging new cases. The roundtables
were invitation only and always included the major LGBT litigation-oriented
organizations. Other lawyers, particularly those at ACLU state affiliates,
were often invited when they were working on relevant cases. Law professors
working on law and sexuality were the final group of regular participants at
these meetings. Rubenfeld explained the reasoning behind only inviting
lawyers to these roundtables: The goal was debating and refining judicial
arguments. To keep the meetings productive, they wanted to only invite
those with relevant expertise.204
The LGBT legal organizations’ newsletters provide evidence of how the
roundtables were an identity-building project. Lambda Legal’s own
newsletter announced that the meeting “represents the first joint effort of the
ACLU and gay/lesbian rights organizations to fight anti-gay
discrimination.”205 GLAD’s newsletters from the time advertised their
ongoing participation in a new coalition effort to reform sodomy laws.206
LRP described the “exchange [of] ideas and research” and their own role in
“compiling a national list of psychiatrists and psychologists who might serve
as expert witnesses.”207 NGRA described the new “strategy planning
201
202
203

204
205
206
207

Id.
Telephone Interview with Abby Rubenfeld, Former Legal Director, Lambda Legal (Apr. 18, 2014).
See ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 121 (explaining that the “[t]he Litigators’ Roundtable, successor to
the Ad-Hoc Task Force, played an important role in facilitating . . .” the incorporation of federal
constitutional claims into sodomy cases); Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing in the Shadow of the Law:
Lesbian and Gay Rights in the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, in 31 RES. IN SOC. MOVEMENTS,
CONFLICTS, AND CHANGE 175, 192 (Patrick G. Coy ed., 2010) (“The Roundtables continued as a
more formal coalition of various organizations headed by Lambda to coordinate litigation strategies
among a variety of different issues.”); Arthur S. Leonard, A Retrospective on the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 403, 410 (2000) (noting that Lambda hosts roundtable meetings every
six months); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 973–74 (2010)
("Lawyers at these lead organizations meet frequently, including at an annual litigators’ roundtable,
to develop and implement strategy.” (footnote omitted)). For criticism of the roundtables, see infra
note 212.
Telephone Interview with Abby Rubenfeld, supra note 202.
Lambda and ACLU Hold Conference on Sodomy Laws, supra note 200, at 3.
See GLAD Annual Report 3 (1984) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD files).
See Lesbian Rights Project Newsletter (1984) (on file with author).
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conference” in its newsletters, and even the Gay Rights Coalition of the
ACLU of Southern California mentioned the efforts.208 This prominent
advertising of the roundtables, which tapered off by the late 1980s, signals
how the lawyers understood their importance in developing a new field form.
They saw the roundtables as conferring additional legitimacy on their
identities as LGBT legal organizations. As the form of the roundtables was
institutionalized and assumed, it no longer merited mention in newsletters.
While the first meetings of the roundtables were organized informally by
Abby Rubenfeld as legal director of Lambda; by 1985 Lambda’s board of
directors voted to officially incorporate the roundtables into Lambda’s
goals.209 They defined the goals as focusing on litigation, legislation, and
education efforts to repeal sodomy laws and providing a space for face-toface meetings between litigators. By this time, LGBT legal organizations
were preparing to challenge sodomy laws at the U.S. Supreme Court.
During this Supreme Court challenge, the roundtables came to be taken for
granted.
This early history of the sodomy roundtables reveals a growing consensus
that the LGBT legal organizations should coordinate their work and that
sodomy reform litigation would be central to several overlapping litigation
goals.210 But the roundtables were never only about sodomy. The lawyers
understood that the Court was not going to overturn sodomy laws based only
on the right to privacy or the right to be left alone. The Court needed to
understand how sodomy laws infringed on concepts of dignity that went
beyond narrow forms of LGBT rights. Thus, discussions about sodomy
reform were also discussions about all the other issues that LGBT legal
organizations were handling.211
By making the roundtables lawyer-only, the LGBT legal organizations
set out to maintain space for critical dissent over litigation strategy.212 The
208

209
210

211

212

NGRA Newsletter (summer 1985) (on file with GLBT Historical Society, NGRA Files); ACLU of
Southern California, Gay Rights Chapter, Newsletter (1984) (on file with ONE National Gay and
Lesbian Archives, Gay Rights Chapter Files).
Sodomy Challenge Project, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.),
Winter 1985, at 1, 5.
This coordination would result in a set of shared norms and expectations for an LGBT legal field.
See NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 10 (2012) (describing shared norms
as key element of an established organizational field).
Cf. NeJaime, supra note 6, at 677–78 (arguing that marriage, even though not explicitly mentioned,
“set the stage for discussion, provided the context for analysis, furnished the basis for comparison,
and highlighted the points of conflict” for discussions on LGBT issues).
At various times, different lawyers have criticized the roundtables’ exclusiveness. My analysis
identifies key benefits and limitations of the roundtable model, but ultimately these criticisms are
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debate over whether to invite Arthur Warner underscores how the
roundtables were in fact used to foster dissent rather than to create
homogeneity. Many of the lawyers at the LGBT legal organizations
preferred to deal with Warner “at arm’s length” because of his difficult
personality.213 Despite concerns that he would seek to dominate the
conversation, Abby Rubenfeld ultimately decided to invite Warner because
all the relevant voices should be heard in the debates over sodomy reform.214
This institutionalization of dissent over legal strategy supports my argument
that LGBT rights as a category was more capacious than we imagine it.
B. Pre-Hardwick Sodomy Reform Litigation
Now I turn to debates within the LGBT legal organizations over sodomy
reform. In Walter Barnett’s 1973 study, prepared as part of a challenge to
Texas’s sodomy law, Barnett explained that privacy offered the most obvious
doctrinal foothold for sodomy reform litigation.215 But, Barnett stressed, the
doctrinal meaning of privacy was not clear and its application to sodomy laws
was uncertain.216 Barnett thus explored other legal theories that would apply
to sodomy laws. Barnett’s motivations for his study reveal the influence of
the right to be sexual: “Individuals should be encouraged, rather than
discouraged, to venture as close to the line [of acceptable sexual behavior] as
they wish.”217
Barnett’s study set out the doctrinal tension between the right to be left
alone and the right to be sexual. Debates over sodomy reform within the
LGBT legal organizations reveal the same tension. In a classic explanation
for the importance of sodomy reform, NGRA said: “We consider the
sodomy statutes important because, although rarely enforced, they create a
hostile climate and provide specious justification for discrimination in

213
214
215
216
217

beyond the scope of this article. See Gabriel Arkles et al., The Role of Lawyers in Trans Liberation:
Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 579, 586–94 (2010)
(criticizing roundtables for excluding trans people and people of color); see also VAID, supra note 7,
at 133 (arguing that gay rights lawyers have built structures for cooperation through formal
conferences like the Sodomy Roundtables but, operationally, cooperation is minimal); Chai R.
Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All about Gender?, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. FOR HUM. RTS.
623, 632–35 (2000) (noting interest in raising issues regarding gender nonconformity at the
roundtable discussions and mixed reception to those discussions).
Interview with Tom Coleman, supra note 85.
See Letter from Abby Rubenfeld, Legal Director, Lambda Legal, to Bill Gardner, Member, NCSCL
(1983) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers).
WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPRESSIVE SEX LAWS 52 (1973).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 30.
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employment, the military, immigration, and child custody and visitation
cases.”218 The concerns with a “hostile climate” and issues of military,
immigration, and child custody all go beyond the narrow bounds of the right
to be left alone.
Lambda’s newsletters presented this broader set of demands as “the
opportunity to make the sexual expression of our homosexuality legal in New
York[.]”219 In an editorial comment in the Lambda newsletter, Rosalyn
Richter connected sodomy reform to abortion rights. She described the
privacy interest at stake as “including the right to make choices affecting
one’s body.”220 Richter framed the decision from the New York Court of
Appeals striking down their sodomy law as based on this broader right.
An NCSCL report at the ACLU biennial convention in 1983 provides a
good example of how this tension played out with respect to specific doctrinal
arguments. The NCSCL report described a decision to add a motion to
dismiss for discriminatory enforcement of sodomy laws.221 They were
concerned that winning on this procedural argument could let the court
avoid the substantive arguments about sexual privacy, but included it
because a hearing on the question of enforcement would allow them to
introduce statistical evidence showing how sodomy laws were used to restrict
a wide-range of sexual conduct and choices.222 The same report explained
the advantage of the consolidated appeal in People v. Onofre.223 In particular,
including a prostitution arrest of a heterosexual woman would bring to light
the full range of sexual choices implicated by the sodomy law, “making it
more difficult to distinguish the ruling on a narrow factual pattern of the case
below.”224
Internal debates within the ACLU over sodomy reform are particularly
revealing for understanding the complicated politics around the right to be
left alone and the right to be sexual. In 1966, the ACLU adopted a policy
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Letter from NGRA to National Gay Task Force (1980) (on file with Cornell University Library,
NGTF Papers).
The Challenge to New York’s Sodomy Statute, LAMBDA: NEWS FROM LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. & EDUC,
FUND, INC. (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1980, at 1.
Rosalyn Richter, Editorial, The Right to Privacy, NEWS FROM LAMBDA (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1981, at 2.
See NCSCL Report for 1983 ACLU Biennial Conference (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University, Warner Papers) (discussing companion case to People v. Onofre).
See id.
415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980). In People v. Onofre, the New York state Court of Appeals in a
consolidated case held that New York’s sodomy law was unconstitutional. Id. at 937.
See NCSCL Report, supra note 221, at 3 (discussing People v. Sweat). See also Memo of William
Gardner (1983) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers) (suggesting
combined appeal introduces “overbreadth” concerns of sodomy law).
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on sexual privacy that included homosexuality.225 The ACLU policy
“support[ed] only the private behavior of consenting adults.” It refused to
take a position on the morality of any conduct and did not cover solicitation
laws. The policy also stated that “in certain jobs there may be a relevancy
between the job and a person’s private sexual conduct, including
homosexuality.”226
This ACLU national policy embraced only the narrow right to be left
alone as the justification for overturning sodomy laws. But this was not the
only voice within the ACLU. A year earlier, the ACLU of Southern
California adopted a policy on homosexuality with broader justifications:
“In respect to private conduct by adults, each individual has the right to
decide what kind of sexual practices he or she will or will not engage in, what
techniques will be used, and whether or not a contraceptive should be
used.”227 Even with the national board, there was fierce debate. Some board
members seemed comfortable with allowing sodomy laws to remain on the
books, questioning only police enforcement practices, while other board
members argued that the policy should logically extend to cover employment
and other issues as well.228
Using ACLU policy on privacy as a starting point, lawyers for the ACLU
setting out to challenge sodomy laws pushed for a broader agenda that fully
encompassed the right to be sexual. Marilyn Haft described sodomy laws as
a starting point for the work of the ACLU Sexual Privacy Project. She
explained that these laws are “a thin veneer for societal disapproval of
differing modes of sexual orientation and life styles.”229 Haft saw overturning
sodomy laws as one piece of the broader project of challenging social norms
about sexuality. Her correspondence related to potential sodomy litigation
does not show a pre-determined legal theory but a grappling with various
legal theories and fact patterns.230 Flowing from her understanding of
privacy, her legal agenda included concerns with solicitation and loitering
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See ACLU Board Minutes (Nov. 16, 1966) (on file with author).
See id. (noting in general that sexual orientation should not be a bar to employment).
Sex-Civil Liberties Statement Passed, OPEN FORUM (ACLU of Southern California, L.A., Cal.) Jan.
1966, at 1.
Compare ACLU Board Minutes, supra note 225 (focusing on police enforcement practices as greater
concern than sodomy laws themselves) with ACLU Due Process Comm. Minutes (Dec. 1965) (on
file with author) (discussing extension of American Law Institute policy position to employment).
See Letter from Marilyn Haft to ACLU State Affiliates (June 25, 1973) (on file with Mudd Library,
Princeton University, ACLU Papers) (describing founding of Sexual Privacy Project).
See id. Other correspondence in this collection discusses specific potential litigation, including fact
patterns, state and federal laws, affidavits, and concerns with injury and standing.
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laws, the dignity of LGBT prisoners, and the expression of gender
nonconformity by trans people.231
LGBT activists did see some signs that the courts might be receptive to
the concerns raised by the right to be sexual. Hardwick was the first time that
the Supreme Court fully addressed the constitutionality of sodomy laws, but
the Court had previously summarily affirmed a lower court decision
upholding the constitutionality of a sodomy law in Doe v. Commonwealth’s
Attorney for Richmond.232 An ACLU lawyer in Virginia argued the case after
political activist Bruce Voeller discussed a potential sodomy challenge with
Justice William Douglas. Justice Douglas suggested that the Supreme Court
might be open to a sodomy challenge if the case showed that plaintiffs “lived
in dread of [the law’s] enforcement.”233
According to the district court in Doe, the right to privacy enunciated in
Griswold v. Connecticut was also about the sanctity of home and family.234 But
the court did not consider homosexuality part of home or family life.
Moreover, the court explained that sodomy laws are justified because
homosexuality “is likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency.”235
The dissenting opinion described privacy in terms of “one’s decisions on
private matters of intimate concern.”236 The advice from Justice Douglas
and the dissenting opinion in Doe both reflect activists’ contention that
privacy included respect for dignity and sexual autonomy.
In People v. Onofre, which held New York’s sodomy law unconstitutional,
LGBT legal organizations again hoped to bring a sodomy challenge to the
U.S. Supreme Court.237 Unlike in Doe, which relied on affidavits testifying
that the plaintiff feared prosecution, Ronald Onofre was prosecuted for
private, consensual sex with another man, “almost unheard of in modern
New York legal lore.”238 In addition to addressing concerns over standing,
231
232
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234
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238

See id.
Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The Supreme Court affirmed
a district court’s holding that a state sodomy statute was constitutional as the state had a rational
basis for criminalizing sodomy in the “promotion of morality and decency[.]” Doe v.
Commonwealth’s Att’y for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975).
RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING 283 (1993); see also id. (discussing Voeller’s meeting and
strategy).
Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201–02 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486(1965)).
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 36, at 219-22 (discussing role of LGBT legal
organizations in People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)).
See Memo of William Gardner, supra note 224. Gardner explains that Onofre’s seventeen-year-old
partner initially alleged use of force, but the District Attorney dropped the charges for forced
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this fact pattern allowed the lawyers to more vividly describe the violation of
privacy in terms of personal integrity. The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Onofre, but the opinion from the New York Court of Appeals partially
reflected advocates’ understanding of the right to be sexual:
[T]he right addressed in the present context is not, as a literal reading of the
phrase might suggest, the right to maintain secrecy with respect to one’s
affairs or personal behavior; rather, it is a right of independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct
oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmental
restraint[.]239

C. Debates over Hardwick and the Right to Be Sexual
Hardwick is remembered as “a carefully selected test case designed to build
on a decade of legal and political mobilization[.]”240 Under this telling,
Hardwick was the chance to finally test at the Supreme Court the LGBT
movement’s claim that a narrow right to be left alone protected consensual
sodomy in private. This version of the story is not incorrect, but it misses the
tensions over how to capture the broader right to be sexual.
On August 3, 1982, Michael Hardwick was arrested for oral sex in the
privacy of his own bedroom by a police officer entering Hardwick’s home on
an invalid warrant.241 Clint Sumrall, who was working with the local ACLU,
first identified Hardwick’s arrest three days later and contacted Hardwick.242
Sumrall had been searching for a case to challenge Georgia’s sodomy law for
the last five years, but every other case involved complicating factors such as
marijuana possession.243 Hardwick’s case seemed perfect: A police officer
with no legitimate reason to be in Hardwick’s apartment arrested Hardwick
in his bed for consensual sex. Sumrall put Hardwick in touch with John
Sweet and Louis Levenson who agreed to represent him. John Sweet was on
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243

sodomy after evidence showed it was fully consensual. This created a “perfect standing situation.”
Id.
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 939 (citations omitted).
ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 4.
PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 381–82 (1988). Officer K.R. Torick
entered Hardwick’s apartment on “warrant for Hardwick’s arrest on a charge of failing to appear
in court for drinking in public.” Id. at 381. However, Torick never served the arrest warrant and
the warrant was invalid because, three weeks earlier, Hardwick appeared in court, paid a fine for
his public-drinking ticket, “which wiped out the warrant.” Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 396. Sumrall consistently searched arrest records for sodomy cases so he could try to get a
test case. Id. George Brenning suggested that Sumrall may have also learned of Hardwick’s arrest
through the local bar scene. Telephone Interview with George Brenning (Jul. 8, 2014).
Interview with George Brenning, supra note 242; see also IRONS, supra note 241, at 396 (“For the last
five years, [Sumrall] would go to the courts every day and find sodomy cases and try to get a test
case.”).
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the board of the ACLU of Georgia, but he took the case as a private case and
not through the ACLU.244 After the Fulton County District Attorney
decided not to press charges, John Sweet asked another lawyer in his office
to file a federal challenge.
Kathy Wilde explained that she began receiving calls accusing her of
“ruining the law for gays nationally” from the day she first filed the federal
challenge.245 In particular, Arthur Warner of NCSCL was adamant that her
federal challenge threatened the state-by-state approach to sodomy reform
he had designed.246 The ACLU supported the case by the time it reached
the Supreme Court, but initially it too resisted supporting Hardwick.247
Because of the devastating loss in Hardwick, it is easy to give too much credit
to these criticisms. But at the time, most lawyers thought they could win.248
By the time Kathy Wilde filed Hardwick in Georgia, the Texas Human
Rights Foundation was waiting for a ruling from the federal district court in
its challenge to the Texas sodomy law.249 When the sodomy roundtables first
took up Hardwick, one of the key strategic questions was over the relative
merits of these two cases as potential vehicles for a Supreme Court challenge.
Unlike Michael Hardwick, Donald Baker was never arrested for sodomy.
THRF recruited Baker for a proactive challenge to the sodomy law. Baker,
a former schoolteacher in Dallas, swore in court that he had sex with men
and was afraid of prosecution under the state sodomy law.250 Michael
Hardwick, the bartender, was sucked into his case after a citation for public
drinking. The lack of any arrests meant that Baker v. Wade lacked the visceral
image of the police at the foot of Michael Hardwick’s bed. On the other
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Telephone Interview with Kathy Wilde, Former Lawyer for Michael Hardwick (Jun. 6, 2014);
Interview with George Brenning, supra note 242.
Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244.
See id.
When Hardwick was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, Kathy Wilde wrote to the legal director of
the national ACLU requesting assistance. ACLU national refused because the Georgia state
affiliate was not involved. See Letter from ACLU to Kathy Wilde (1983) (on file with Mudd Library,
Princeton University, ACLU Papers). George Brenning suspects that the ACLU of Georgia simply
did not have the resources to dedicate to the case. See Interview with George Brenning, supra note
242.
Immediately after oral arguments at the Supreme Court, some of the lawyers involved suggested
they could win by as much as 7-2. See Letter from Gene Guerrero, Executive Director, ACLU of
Georgia, to Burt Neuborne, ACLU National (Apr. 2, 1986) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University, ACLU Papers).
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
Id. at 1126, 1128.
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hand, Baker did include a full trial record while Hardwick was appealed from
a motion to dismiss.251
In addition to the strikingly different fact patterns, lawyers at the
roundtables debated the legal theories at play in the two cases. The Texas
sodomy law applied only to same-sex conduct. This allowed THRF to make
an equal protection argument unavailable in Hardwick.252 Because the
Georgia law on its face applied equally to heterosexual and homosexual
intercourse, any equal protection challenge would require extensive factfinding to show unequal application of the law.253
Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hardwick, mooting the
debate over which case was the best vehicle, roundtable discussions turned
to oral arguments. Because there were no out lesbian or gay lawyers in the
country with experience arguing before the Supreme Court, lawyers at the
roundtable settled on inviting Professor Laurence Tribe to argue the case.254
Mistakenly assuming Kathy Wilde was a lesbian, some lawyers at the
roundtable resisted this idea, suggesting that “one of us” should argue the
case before the Court.255
A final debate at the round table concerned the exact legal theories to be
used in the brief to the Supreme Court. The first draft of the brief included
sections on privacy, equal protection, and due process. One of the lawyers
at the roundtables described this strategy as appropriate for academic
analysis. But, using it at the Supreme Court invited the Court to issue an
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Cf. id. at 1126–1134 (summarizing the trial testimony by the plaintiff, plaintiff’s expert witnesses,
and defendants’ witnesses and expert witnesses) with Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204
(11th Cir. 1985) (noting the procedural posture—an appeal from the district court’s ruling that the
suit lacked standing, did not state a valid legal claim, and must be dismissed).
Justice O’Connor would later vote to overturn the Texas sodomy law at issue in Lawrence v. Texas
solely on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 36, at 235 (explaining that arguments in the case
included an equal protection challenge). While Kathy Wilde added a heterosexual couple to her
original federal case in Hardwick, the district court dismissed them for lack of standing. Id. at 234.
Multiple interviewees confirm that the idea to invite Tribe came from the roundtables but cannot
recall exactly who suggested it. See, e.g., Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244; Interview with
Jay Kohorn, supra note 85; see also ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 255 n.46 (confirming that the
historical record is vague but recalls that members of roundtable task force suggested bringing in
Tribe). A year later, in 1987, openly lesbian lawyer, Mary Dunlap, argued before the Supreme
Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 524 (1987).
See Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244 (noting that she outed herself as heterosexual to
these lawyers in later conversation). Wilde participated in writing the brief but explained that she
was happy to relinquish control of the case.
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anti-gay ruling across all three doctrinal arguments.256 If the Court wanted
to rule against the sodomy law, it would reach whatever legal theory it
wanted whether or not it was in the main brief. But LGBT legal
organizations were already making important advances under equal
protection. Better not to risk that along with privacy and due process.257
Responding to this concern, the final brief submitted to the Supreme Court
focused more narrowly on privacy and the demand to be left alone by the
state.
There are multiple ways to interpret these debates. Perhaps the most
obvious way is just to see them as a debate over legal strategy. Because of
uncertainty over the precedential value of Doe and broader implications of
privacy, Baker’s equal protection theory was arguably a more promising route
to challenge sodomy laws than Hardwick’s privacy argument. In addition,
Baker’s factual record included testimony that could be helpful in establishing
an equal protection violation. A second way to interpret these debates is
through the lens of a politics of respectability. Donald Baker was an
upstanding schoolteacher in a long-term relationship. Michael Hardwick
was a bartender having sex with a married man. Donald Baker fit the
wholesome American image better than Michael Hardwick. By barely
discussing homosexuality at all and stressing the narrow right to be left alone,
the final brief in Hardwick also seems consistent with this interpretation.
Without denying the validity of either of these, I turn to a third interpretation.
These debates reveal the ongoing tension between strategies based on the
right to be left alone and those based on the right to be sexual.
Finally, I turn to the amicus briefs in Hardwick for further support for my
arguments. The brief of the LRP most explicitly argued for the right to be
sexual.258 In a law review article introducing the amicus brief, Mary Dunlap
described LRP’s brief as the only one to forthrightly argue for the legitimacy
of LGBT people and relationships.259 In contrast, Dunlap described the
main brief as arguing only that the state needs to leave LGBT people alone:
Tolerance can include disapproval for what is tolerated. Dunlap was right
256

257
258

259

Jay Kohorn voiced his concerned at a roundtable discussion regarding Tribe’s legal theories,
arguing that the legal theories, while good, went against the strategy of forming consensus among
lower courts prior to being argued at the Supreme Court. See Interview with Jay Kohorn, supra
note 85 (“[D]on’t play with these legal theories at the expense of our lives.”).
Id.
Brief for Lesbian Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 11, at 9
(“The Right To Be Sexual In Consenting, Non-Violent And Physically Private Ways Constitutes
One Essential Dimension Of Personal Privacy Of The Adult Human Being.”).
See Dunlap, supra note 11, at 950 (describing the Lesbian Rights Project et al.’s amicus brief as
unique because it took a more radical position than other briefs).
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to describe the LRP brief as more explicitly arguing for a right to be sexual,
but the LRP brief was not as radically different from the others as her
description might suggest. LRP’s amicus brief also drew on the right to
privacy.260 The key difference is that LRP started from the importance of
sexuality and built to privacy from there. Lambda Legal’s amicus brief
discussed homosexuality as a “healthy and natural expression of love”261 but
focused on a more traditional understanding of privacy than evidenced in
the LRP brief. Lambda’s brief continued on to primarily focus on the failure
of Georgia’s sodomy law to be narrowly tailored to any state interest. Here
Lambda’s brief wandered further from the right to be sexual, as alleged by
Dunlap. Finally, NGRA’s brief argued that state police power does not
extend to regulating moral behavior.262 This can be read, as suggested by
Dunlap, as a very narrow demand that the police leave LGBT people alone.
Whatever else they can do, the police cannot enter the bedroom. Another
way to understand NGRA’s brief is through the literal image of the police
officer standing in Michael Hardwick’s bedroom. Understood through this
lens, NGRA’s focus on the reach of police power is a visceral image of how
the state denies the dignity and moral integrity of same-sex intimacy.
IV. CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL
By tracing the development of LGBT rights from an organizational
perspective, Parts II and III of this Article show the key role that the right to
be sexual played in early LGBT legal activism. The idea of LGBT rights
emerged and was shaped by the right to be sexual as much as by the doctrinal
categories of privacy and equal protection. With this history as background,
we are better equipped to understand the ongoing tensions in LGBT rights
today.
In constitutional litigation on LGBT rights, we see an ongoing tension
between ideas of formal legal equality (LGBT rights) and respect for dignity
and autonomy (the right to be sexual). The right to be sexual is implicit in
Romer’s rejection of animus,263 Lawrence’s emphasis on equal liberty and

260
261
262
263

Brief for Lesbian Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 11, at
9.
Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et
al. at 3, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140).
Brief of Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 632 (1996) (declaring that Colorado’s state constitutional
amendment, which repealed ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, is “inexplicable by anything but animus”).
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autonomy,264 and Windsor and Obergefell’s discussion of dignity.265 Together,
these opinions reflect a new regime of respect for the autonomy of sexual
conduct. Most importantly, all four of these opinions reject a mode of
constitutional inquiry that treats equality and liberty as separate and distinct
inquiries.266 While none of these opinions explicitly recognize the right to be
sexual, the growing recognition of liberty and autonomy carry with them an
inherent recognition of the right to be sexual.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court explained that there was no
history of protecting homosexual sodomy in the United States.267 In fact,
quite the opposite, the Court claimed that homosexual sodomy had long
been singled out and criminalized by every state in the country.268 Based on
this view of the history, Hardwick described the claim that sodomy laws
violated the right to privacy as “at best, facetious.”269 As a formal legal
matter, the opinion was only about whether privacy extended to consensual
sex between two adults in private. The Court rejected claims to formal
equality, or the idea that lesbians and gays are “just like” everyone else. But
Hardwick was also an expression of disgust towards lesbians and gays.270 It
was a deep-seated rejection of the right to be sexual. The lawyers understood
that overturning Hardwick would not be simply a matter of changing privacy
doctrine.271 It also required winning respect for the dignity of LGBT people.

264

265

266

267
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269
270
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See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its special and in its more transcendent dimensions.”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“There is dignity in the bond between two
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2013) (considering the notion that
same-sex couples aspire to have the same dignity as heterosexual couples in lawful marriage).
See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (2004) (arguing the
Supreme Court in Lawrence recognized the synergy between the doctrines of equal protection and
due process).
See 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986) (analyzing the history of sodomy laws).
Id. at 193. However, Bill Eskridge challenges that conclusion, explaining that Kansas was the first
state to single out same-sex conduct in 1969. ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 165. Prior to 1969,
sodomy laws included all sexually deviant behavior and data suggests that most arrests were not for
consensual same-sex adult intimacy. Id. at 98.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77–84 (2010) (discussing principle of disgust within Hardwick).
For law review articles on this point from two prominent lawyers in the LGBT rights movement,
see Hunter, supra note 193, at 533 (describing a “gay-friendly deconstruction of the new sexual
orientation categories”); Abby R. Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflection upon Bowers v. Hardwick,
11 NOVA L. REV. 59, 68 (1986) (stressing the importance of grass-roots organizing and education
to overturn Hardwick in the future).
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In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court indicated a new willingness to
consider the claims of LGBT people.272 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
described the harm imposed by Colorado’s Amendment 2 in broad,
sweeping language: “[I]ts sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects.”273 The majority opinion is very short, uses no
footnotes, and barely mentions sexuality at all.274 As prominently pointed
out by Justice Scalia in his dissent, the majority opinion did not mention or
cite Bowers v. Hardwick at all.275
This short opinion is susceptible to at least two major readings. One
reading is that Romer is a very narrow decision, barely changing existing equal
protection precedent at all. On this reading, Amendment 2 was invalid
because it was blatantly discriminatory.276 Less overt discrimination might
still pass muster. According to this narrow reading, Romer said nothing about
laws that targeted sexual conduct. On the other hand, Romer’s discussion of
animus supported a broader reading. Louis Seidman explained that “most
discrimination against gay people rests at bottom on moral disapproval,
which the Court has now recharacterized as irrational animosity.”277
I argue that Romer’s discussion of animus offers tentative support for the
right to be sexual. Romer is consistent with the principle that moral
disapproval of sexual conduct is not a rational basis for the law.278
Amendment 2 illegitimately defined a group for the sole purpose of casting
them out from society.279 This conclusion is particularly supported by the
272
273
274

275
276

277

278
279

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 632.
One academic describes these characteristics of the opinion as “generative.” Louis Michael
Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67,
70 (1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 635 (describing the breadth of Amendment 2 as incongruent with any alleged government
interest). Several scholars have interpreted Romer in these terms. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution
of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2317 (1997) (describing Romer as standing only for the “tentative”
conclusion that “majorities cannot express overt hatred for groups”); Richard F. Duncan, The
Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response
to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 148 (1997) (describing Romer as “both narrow
and shallow”); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257,
257 (1996) (contending that Romer “does not significantly expand current law”).
Seidman, supra note 274, at 85. See also Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 93 (1997); see also id. (describing all laws singling out lesbians and
gays as suspect based on an impermissible purpose analysis under Romer).
Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV.
833, 850 (1998).
See Farber & Sherry, supra note 276, at 258 – 60 (explaining the background of Romer and the
Supreme Court’s ruling).
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Supreme Court’s refusal to use the rationale offered by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Under the state court’s approach, Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional because it disabled lesbians and gays in the political process.
The Supreme Court relied on animus instead of the political process
doctrine, which necessarily implicated questions of morality.280 In the
broadest reading, Romer encompasses the relationship between equality,
privacy, and bodily integrity in queer lives.281
Lawrence v. Texas explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, announcing a new
era of judicial respect for lesbians and gays.282 But the exact meaning of
Lawrence was up for debate.283 Particularly noteworthy was Lawrence’s
seeming rejection of the language of privacy for the language of liberty. In
its opening lines, Lawrence announced: “The instant case involves liberty of
the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”284
Picking up on this language, some scholars went so far as to describe Lawrence
as the gay rights movement’s Brown.285
On this reading, Lawrence’s invocation of liberty embraced respect for
decisional autonomy. Noting that the opinion barely uses the word
“privacy,” Nan Hunter argued that Lawrence signals a move towards “a new
principle of equal liberty.”286 Lawrence accomplished this partially by
recasting the Griswold line of cases as about sexual activity, rather than the
abstract decision to become a parent.287 In so doing, Lawrence made consent
and autonomy the touchstone of protection for sexual activity.
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Flagg, supra note 278, at 841.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 219 (1996)
(arguing that the Attainder Clause of the Constitution illuminates the opinion in Romer and the spirit
of the Equal Protection Clause).
Even critics who read Lawrence narrowly agreed that it was an important decision for LGBT rights.
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1399, 1401 (2004) (“The Court explicitly and unequivocally repudiated its prior jurisdictions in
declaring that sodomy laws violate the U.S. Constitution.” (footnote omitted)).
In addition to the readings I suggest here, other scholars argued that Lawrence is based on tolerance
or libertarianism. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (identifying libertarianism as an underlying principle in Lawrence);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004) (identifying tolerance as an underlying principle
in Lawrence). Lawrence’s meaning for morality as a justification for the law is also relevant, but there
is greater agreement on that point that Lawrence only rejected “explicit morals-based rationales for
lawmaking.” Goldberg, supra note 193, at 1234–35 (footnote omitted).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 193, at 1895 (“For when the history of our times is written, Lawrence may
well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America.”).
Hunter, supra note 266, at 1104..
Id. at 1110.
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Other language in Lawrence suggested that it still relied on a “privacy
[that] relegates sexuality to the home, the bedroom, and then into the
closet.”288 Katherine Franke argued that Lawrence embraced a “domesticated
liberty.”289 Although Lawrence repeatedly invoked liberty, “Justice Kennedy
territorializes the right at stake as a liberty to engage in certain conduct in
private.”290 Franke contrasted the discussion of liberty in Lawrence with
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which she described as a “thick form of
autonomy.”291 In contrast, Lawrence “resuscitate[s] a very early, more
limited, and more institutional version of the privacy right.”292
If Hardwick rejected the right to be sexual, Lawrence did not embrace it in
full. But Lawrence does show a partial and tentative embrace of the right to
be sexual. Two comparisons to Hardwick underscore this point. Most
notably, Lawrence rejected the fundamental rights inquiry used by Hardwick.293
Hardwick held that there was no fundamental right to sodomy because it was
not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”294 Lawrence
rejected Hardwick’s discussion of the history of sodomy regulation, but the
decision in Lawrence did not rest on whether there was a fundamental right,
rooted in the history and tradition of the nation.295 Nan Hunter and
Laurence Tribe both argued that in Lawrence, a newer model of substantive
due process inquiry crystalized that turned the Court’s inquiry to whether a
law imposed a dignitary burden.296

288

289
290
291
292
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294
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296

Ruthann Robson, The Missing Word in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 397, 398
(2004). While Hunter is correct that Lawrence barely references “privacy” as a doctrinal principle,
it frequently discusses “private” conduct.
See Franke supra note 282, 1400 (arguing that Lawrence relies on “a narrow version of liberty that is
both geographized and domesticated”).
Id. at 1403.
Id. at 1402.
Id. at 1404.
See Hunter, supra note 266, at 1107–14 (arguing that Lawrence more closely resembles Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Hardwick than Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Hardwick); Tribe, supra note 193, at
1899 (“[T]he Lawrence Court . . . took the Bowers Court to task for the very way it had formulated
the question posed for decision.”).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (citing Moore v. E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–74 (2003) (criticizing discussion of history and morality in
Hardwick).
See Hunter, supra note 266, at 1122 (defining test in terms of arbitrariness of state action); Tribe,
supra note 193, at 1936 (defining test in terms of state interference with primary relationships and
associational rights).
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Lawrence also makes equality far more important.297 In Hardwick, the
lower court dismissed a heterosexual couple because they were at no risk of
persecution under the law.298 The Supreme Court described the question
before it as one of “homosexual sodomy,” even though the Georgia law in
question was not gay specific.299 In Lawrence, on the other hand, advocates
deliberately challenged a law in a state that was gay specific. But the
Supreme Court now expressly rejected a more limited equal protectionbased decision.300 Overturning the Texas law on this equal protection logic
would have resulted in a sort of shallow, formalistic equality.301 But the Court
chose instead a deeper equality that was about the dignity of the couples
involved.
Even to the extent that Lawrence can be described as using a privacy that
relegates sexuality “into the closet,”302 that privacy was only accepted
because the Court also tentatively accepted the dignity of human sexuality.
Here, I ask whether we can imagine an opinion in Lawrence that reached the
same legal conclusion but with a similar tone of disgust for gay sex as
evidenced in Hardwick. This counterfactual might be logically possible, but I
argue that in practice it was impossible. Privacy does not prevent the state
from regulating a great deal of conduct that it finds truly deviant.303 It might
be possible to imagine a Lawrence opinion that took a similar tone of moral
distance to Stanley v. Georgia.304 But even that Lawrence would be different from
the one that we have. Lawrence only gets to where it does because of some
partial acceptance of the dignity of human sexuality.
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Some scholars interpreted Lawrence as primarily an equal protection decision. See, e.g., Miranda
Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group
Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (2004) (arguing that “Lawrence is more of an equal
protection case than a substantive due process case). But Lawrence itself expressly rejects equal
protection alone as a sufficient basis for its decision. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75.
Kathy Wilde added this couple to the complaint to show the reach of the Georgia law. The couple
claimed that they regularly violated the sodomy law and feared arrest. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE
PASSIONS, supra note 36, at 234–36.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has
continuing validity.”).
Laurence Tribe argued that the question of whether sodomy laws formally applied to everyone or
singled out same-sex sexual conduct was irrelevant because sodomy was so thoroughly culturally
identified with gay people. Tribe, supra note 193, at 1905.
Robson, supra note 288, at 398.
Here, for example, it is relevant that Lawrence itself notes as a limit to the decision that it does not
deal with prostitution. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559, 566 (1969) (overturning arrest for private possession of
obscene material at home but suggesting such material might be without real worth).
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However, Lawrence also signals deep ambivalence on the Court over the
meaning of sexuality. I think the Court does not even recognize this tension.
Franke reads Lawrence’s description of the deep and intimate bonds between
a couple as signaling a limit to the reach of liberty in Lawrence. But the Court
uses this language as a signal of how sexual autonomy is a basic part of human
dignity. Both of these readings are correct. Like Franke, I fear that this logic
can lead us down a road to accepting a domesticated liberty that at best
accepts a right to be sexual for only some people. But I also argue that we
can exploit this tension, using the Court’s implicit and partial acceptance of
the right to be sexual as a tool to further expand it.
In United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, we see how the tension
between the approaches of LGBT rights and the right to be sexual continue
to shape Supreme Court doctrine.305 If liberty is the dominant theme of
Lawrence, dignity is the dominant theme of Windsor. But the locus of that
dignity has also shifted. Lawrence began a shift from the individual to the
couple. In Windsor, individual LGBT people disappear entirely. The
decision is now entirely about the couple, and sexuality is almost entirely
absent from the pages of the opinion.306 Moreover, doctrinally, the opinion
can be read as a narrow decision based on federalism rather than anything
else.307 In this sense, Windsor can be read as a retreat further into the
domesticated liberty that Franke described in Lawrence.
On the other hand, the discussion of dignity is potentially a signal of a
broader transformation. On this reading, the liberty of Lawrence becomes the
dignity of Windsor and represents a broader willingness of the Court to
consider sexual conduct as a basic part of human identity. Obergefell continues
this trajectory. On the one hand, it is even more couched in the notion of
protecting the domesticated vision of marriage than Windsor. On the other
hand, Obergefell applies a more robust analysis to the state’s justifications for
restricting activity based on sexual identities.
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See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“The fundamental liberties protected by
[the Due Process] Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In addition
these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citations omitted). See United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (explaining federalism concerns inherent in issue
of marriage).
See Ben-Asher, supra note 21, at 258 (“[T]he legal homosexual is now consistently represented as a
‘same-sex couple’ . . . while the term ‘homosexual’ has virtually disappeared.” (footnote omitted).
Justice Roberts stresses this reading of the opinion. See id. at 261 (“[T]he dissenters emphasized
that, after Windsor, it is still legitimate at the state level to confer dignity on opposite-sex couples but
not same sex couples.” (footnote omitted)); see also Windsor, 136 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court was not decided the question of whteher states may continue to
“utilize the traditional definition of marriage”).
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CONCLUSION
Inherent to the history of LGBT rights is the tension between claims to
being just like everyone else and claims to being different and deserving of
autonomy and respect. This Article offers deeper insight into how that
tension has shaped debates within the LGBT legal movement, and ultimately
how that tension has shaped the development of constitutional law.
Lawyers at the LGBT legal organizations exploited the ambiguity
between tolerance and the right to be sexual. Tolerance demanded merely
that the state ignore deviant conduct. The right to be sexual defined allegedly
deviant conduct as a healthy and natural part of the human experience to be
valued and nurtured. Tolerance has been described as too limited a
justification for real social change, but this Article shows how tolerance was
not merely a trap.308 Tolerance was a hook to begin a dialogue on dignity
and LGBT rights. Before LGBT people could be accepted as just like
everyone else, they had to be accepted for their right to be different.
I do not mean to suggest that the courts are likely to embrace the right to
be sexual in such explicit terms. But even without such explicit embrace of
the right to be sexual, this Article has shown how doctrine regarding privacy
and equality has subsumed at least some of the ideas generated by the right
to be sexual. Thus, the history discussed in this Article suggests the key role
that the right to be sexual could continue to play in new claims to LGBT
rights.
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Cf. WALTERS, supra note 172, 260–70 (discussing “the tolerance trap”).
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